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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a state where the legislature created and passed a 
comprehensive system of protection laws for survivors of domestic 
violence. Now imagine that a county within that state implemented a 
specialized courthouse where the judges are trained to focus solely on 
civil orders of protection and misdemeanor domestic violence-related 
crimes. Finally, imagine that the courthouse has a play area and child 
care for children, to enable survivors who do not have available child 
care; a special elevator and waiting area just for the petitioners, so 
they can safely wait for their cases away from their abusers; and 
domestic violence advocates, pro bono attorneys, a lawyer-staffed 
Vol. 10.1]   Debra Pogrund Stark  
	  
	  132 
clinic, and prosecutors with the state attorney’s office all operating to 
assist survivors seeking orders of protection or criminal prosecution 
of domestic violence-related crimes. The confluence of these 
circumstances creates the hope, indeed the reasonable expectation, 
that survivors of domestic violence will receive the justice they 
deserve. While a system this complete and equitable may seem 
politically impossible, it exists in Illinois.  
In 1982, the Illinois legislature passed the Illinois Domestic 
Violence Act (the Act) and most recently passed an updated version 
in 2012.1 The courthouse described opened in Chicago, Illinois on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See Domestic Violence Law in Illinois, ILL. COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE, http://www.ilcadv.org/dv_law_in_il/default.html (last visited Jan. 8, 
2015). The Illinois legislature passed an updated version of the Act in 2012. See 
infra Part I for a description of the broad class of relationships covered, the broad 
types of abuse covered, and the expansive set of remedies a state legislature such as 
this created in Illinois. The following are some additional special protections for 
survivors covered by the Illinois Domestic Violence Act (the Act): no filing fees, 
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/202(b) (2012); “simplified forms and clerical assistance” 
for pro se petitions, id. at 60/202(d); omission of the petitioner’s address on all court 
filings for safety reasons, id. at 60/203(b); domestic abuse advocates’ assistance in 
preparing petitions, attending and sitting at counsel table, and conferring with the 
victim, id. at 60/205(b)(1)-(3); granting privilege to victims’ communications with 
advocates, see id. at 60/227. In addition, the Act limits the rights of the accused 
abuser in multiple ways. For example, the Act: only requires preponderance of the 
evidence as the burden of proof, id. at 60/205(a), does not require “physical 
manifestations of abuse on the person of the victim” to obtain an order of 
protection, id. at 60/214(a); does not grant the alleged abuser the right to a jury trial 
for an order of protection, id. at 60/206; does not allow for mutual orders of 
protection (only successive orders of protection), id. at 60/215; allows for a law 
enforcement official to serve a short form notification of the order of protection, id. 
at 60/222.10(a); allows ex parte emergency orders of protection to last for up to 
twenty-one days, id. at 60/220(a)(1); , and an order of protection following a 
hearing, a plenary order, can be up to a period of two years, id. at 60/220(b), or 
potentially longer when the order is issued in the context of another matter. 
id.Further, Article III of the Act details law enforcement responsibilities when 
responding to alleged domestic violence incidents, including filing police reports for 
every bona fide allegation and enumerating several forms of victim assistance for 
safety, medical needs, and preventing further abuse. See id. at 60/304. Article III 
also requires law enforcement to collect data in a format accessible to police [Needs 
a citation; does not match 305] and others assisting survivors and provides for law 
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October 11, 2005.2 This Article examines how the specialized 
domestic violence courthouse in Chicago implements these laws.3 
Where the courthouse falls short, this Article will explore why, what 
can be done, and consider implications for other jurisdictions seeking 
to implement similar resources for survivors of domestic violence. 
The results from this empirical study are mixed. On the positive 
side, the data reflect that judges are properly applying many important 
aspects of the new order of protection laws4 and granting a high 
percentage of emergency orders of protection.5 The data also reflect 
that judges fail to grant certain important remedies, even when 
survivors seek the remedies and appear to meet the statutory 
requirements to receive them.6 Judges also fail to specify reasons for 
their denial of certain remedies when issuing an order of protection, 
notwithstanding that the Act requires that an order of protection 
include an explanation for a denial of any sought remedies.7 This 
Article argues that these failures are a form of judicial nullification,8 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
enforcement liability for willful or wanton misconduct in rendering emergency 
assistance or otherwise enforcing. Id. at 60/305. Article IV requires certain health 
care professionals to offer suspected abuse victims information about available 
services. Id. at 60/401.  
2 This courthouse exists at 555 W. Harrison, Chicago, Illinois, [and opened 
October 11, 2005 – this is already in the text, probably doesn’t need to be repeated]. 
According to the court administrator, new judges are trained by the presiding judge, 
provided a manual, required to observe and shadow the courts, and required to 
attend regular annual statewide trainings. In 2011, all judges received two days of 
training on domestic violence through the National Council of Family Court Judges. 
Telephone Interview by Crystal Stewart with Court Administrator, Ill. Domestic 
Violence Division, in Chicago, Ill. (June 26, 2013).  
3 See supra note 1 for a description of the Act. 
4 See infra Part II.B and note 76. The determination that the petitioner appeared 
to be entitled to a remedy was based on a review of the facts contained in the 
affidavit or petition.  
5 See infra Table 1. 
6 See infra Table 2 and Part III (containing the analysis of Table 2). 
7 See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/221(a)(2) (2012) (requiring judges to specify in 
orders of protection reasons for denials of sought remedies); see also infra Part II. 
8 A review of affidavits and petitions found that petitioners often failed to seek 
remedies from which they could have benefitted. See infra Parts II and III. As 
discussed in Part III, there are many reasons why petitioners might not seek 
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judicial refusal to fairly interpret the law. Counter-intuitively, this 
problem may be exacerbated by the specialized nature of this 
domestic violence-focused court. A second important finding is that 
the vast majority of petitioners are pro se, and they often fail to seek 
some of the remedies under the protective legislation implicated by 
their factual situation.  
Part I of this article explains, through a review of the Act, what 
remedies are available under an order of protection and what types of 
abuse and relationships can trigger this protection. Part II and the 
Appendix report on the methods and types of data collected in the 
empirical study. Part III discusses the remedies that judges rarely or 
never grant; explores the philosophical, practical, and psychological 
underpinnings for the judicial nullification phenomenon; and 
contemplates how to address nullification. Part III also explores why 
pro se petitioners leave potentially beneficial remedies unsought and 
proposes an empowerment model of assistance to guide future 
petitioners. Part IV considers how the results and policy implications 
from this study may apply to other jurisdictions. 
I. ORDERS OF PROTECTION AND THE ILLINOIS DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
ACT 
The Illinois Domestic Violence Act establishes laws 
surrounding orders of protection, which provides strong protections to 
survivors of domestic violence.9 The Act was first passed in 1982 and 
most recently updated in 2012. This Part explains three essential 
aspects of orders of protection, in general, and under the Act: (i) the 
types of conduct that constitute “abuse” sufficient for an order of 
protection, (ii) the categories of individuals who are eligible to seek 
an order of protection, and (iii) the kinds of remedies available with 
an order of protection.10 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
remedies from which they could benefit, including not being aware of or 
understanding them, and the perception that judges will not grant those remedies. 
9 See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60 (2012).  
10 While “stay away” (protection) and “stop the abuse” (prohibition of abuse) 
orders are common in many states, the Act includes far more comprehensive 
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A. Types of Conduct Meriting an Order of Protection 
The Act defines the types of conduct that merit an order of 
protection under the definition of “Abuse” and include the following: 
(i) “Physical abuse,” (ii) “Harassment,” (iii) “Intimidation of a 
Dependent,” (iv) “Interference with Personal Liberty,” or (v) “Willful 
Deprivation.”11  
“Physical abuse” includes sexual abuse and any of the 
following: “(i) knowing or reckless use of physical force, confinement 
or restraint; (ii) knowing repeated and unnecessary sleep deprivation; 
or (iii) knowing or reckless conduct which creates an immediate risk 
of physical harm.”12 For example, shoving or throwing an object at an 
intimate partner, even if the person is not harmed, but could have 
been, is Physical Abuse under the Act. 
The concept of “Harassment” is even broader. Harassment is 
defined as “knowing conduct which is not necessary to accomplish a 
purpose that is reasonable under the circumstances; would cause a 
reasonable person emotional distress; and does cause emotional 
distress to the petitioner.”13 This category of abuse captures emotional 
abuse and acts designed to exercise power and control over the 
victim. By including this category, the Act addresses how abuse can 
escalate over time and provides protections before the conduct 
escalates to serious physical harm. The Act presents six examples of 
“Harassment” (rebuttable by a preponderance of the evidence): (i) 
creating a disturbance at petitioner’s place of employment or school; 
(ii) repeatedly telephoning petitioner’s place of employment, home, or 
residence; (iii) repeatedly following petitioner about in a public place 
or places; (iv) repeatedly keeping petitioner under surveillance by 
remaining present outside his or her14 home, school, place of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
remedies designed to better empower survivors to become safe and whole again. 
See id at 60/214-219.  
11 See id. at 60/103. 
12 Id. at 60/103(14)(i)-(iii). 
13 Id. at 60/103(7). 
14 Due to the much higher percentage of male rather than female abusers and 
female rather than male survivors, female pronouns are used for survivors and 
petitioners, and male pronouns are used for abusers and respondents. Nevertheless, 
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employment, vehicle, or other place occupied by petitioner or by 
peering in petitioner’s windows; (v) various forms of concealing or 
threatening to conceal a minor child from petitioner (unless 
respondent was fleeing an incident or pattern of domestic violence); 
or (vi) threatening physical force, confinement, or restraint on one or 
more occasions.15 The Act is clear that these examples of Harassment 
are illustrative rather than exclusive. 
“Intimidation of a dependent” is defined as:  
subjecting a person who is dependent because of age, 
health or disability to participation in or the witnessing 
of: physical force against another or physical 
confinement or restraint of another which constitutes 
physical abuse as defined in this Act, regardless of 
whether the abused person is a family or household 
member.16  
This covers a person who commits physical abuse in front of a child 
or forces or encourages the child to participate in the physical abuse. 
Including this form of abuse is critical because children who are 
exposed to domestic violence can suffer severe consequences.17 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
men are sometimes survivors and petitioners and women are sometimes abusers and 
respondents. In our sample of ninety-three cases, sixteen petitioners (17%) were 
male and seventy-seven petitioners (83%) were female; sixty-six (71%) respondents 
were male and twenty-seven (29%) were female. The author checked whether there 
were gender differences in obtaining emergency orders of protection or plenary 
orders of protection and found that eleven of sixteen male petitioners were granted 
emergency orders of protection (69%) and sixty-four of seventy-seven female 
petitioners were granted emergency orders of protection (83%). This difference did 
not reach statistical significance using a chi-square analysis. The gender difference 
in obtaining plenary orders of protection also failed to reach statistical significance, 
with six of sixteen male petitioners (38%) obtaining it and thirty-six of seventy-
seven (47%) female petitioners obtaining it.  
15 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/103(7). 
16 Id. 60/103(10). 
17 See, e.g., Gayla Margolin, Effects of Domestic Violence on Children, in 
VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN IN THE FAMILY AND THE COMMUNITY 57, 57-101 
(Penelope K. Trickett & Cynthia J. Schellenbach eds., 1998). 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY [2015  
	  
	   137 
“Interference with personal liberty” is defined as “committing or 
threatening physical abuse, harassment, intimidation or willful 
deprivation so as to compel another to engage in conduct from which 
she or he has a right to abstain or to refrain from conduct in which she 
or he has a right to engage.”18 The power and control over partners, 
central to many domestic violence situations, makes this inclusion 
critical. In extreme form, this type of abuse could include preventing 
an abused intimate partner from leaving the house or talking with 
family, friends, or neighbors.  
Finally, “Willful deprivation” is defined as “willfully denying a 
person who because of age, health or disability requires medication, 
medical care, shelter, accessible shelter or services, food, therapeutic 
device, or other physical assistance, and thereby exposing that person 
to the risk of physical, mental or emotional harm. . . .”19 This 
definition includes situations such as an adult child or caretaker who 
fails to provide proper care of an elderly person’s medical or other 
basic needs, but the definition creates an exception where dependents 
express intent to forgo medical care or treatment,20 and does not create 
new affirmative duties to support dependent persons.21 This definition 
also protects “high risk adults with disabilities,”22 or those whose 
physical or mental disability impairs their ability to seek an order of 
protection, from abuse, including “Neglect”23 and “Exploitation.”24 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/103(9). 
19 Id. at 60/103(15). 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 See id. at 60/102(2). 
23 Id. at 60/103(11). 
24 Id. at 60/103(5).  
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B. Relationship to the Abusive Party Necessary for an Order of 
Protection 
In addition to broadly defining Abuse, the Act inclusively 
defines those who can receive protection.25 The Act covers “Family or 
household members” broadly defined to include: 
 
spouses, former spouses, parents, children, 
stepchildren and other persons related by blood or by 
present or prior marriage, persons who share or 
formerly shared a common dwelling, persons who 
have or allegedly have a child in common, persons 
who share or allegedly share a blood relationship 
through a child, persons who have or have had a dating 
or engagement relationship, persons with disabilities 
and their personal assistants, and caregivers. . . .26  
 
It thereby covers not only current or former spouses, and those in a 
dating or engagement relationship, but also those who cohabitate, 
family members, and individuals who are responsible for providing 
care. The Act attempts to clarify what is meant by a “dating 
relationship” by stating, “neither a casual acquaintanceship nor 
ordinary fraternization between 2 individuals in business or social 
contexts shall be deemed to constitute a dating relationship.”27 Based 
on this clarification in the statute, a “date” could include any get-
together that is not part of a casual acquaintanceship or ordinary 
fraternization, such as dinner with a kiss good night. However, one 
Illinois appellate court has nevertheless defined it more narrowly28 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 See id. at 60/103(6).  
26 Id. 
27 Id.  
28 In Alison C. v. Westcott, the court ruled that attending the same school, 
speaking on the telephone, and going on one lunch date in a brief, non-exclusive 
relationship is not a “dating relationship or engagement relationship” under the Act, 
stating that the Act focused on preventing abuse in intimate relationships. 798 N.E. 
2d 813, 815-16 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). Consequently, the court interpreted “dating 
relationship” to mean a “serious courtship.” Id. at 817. Given the statutory mandate 
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and another circuit court judge refused to grant an order of protection 
because the petitioner had only been dating the respondent a few 
weeks.29  
Fortunately, even if judges decide that there is no dating 
relationship due to lack of serious courtship, a petitioner might still 
qualify for an order of protection if he or she had a child or cohabited 
with the respondent.30 Even platonic roommates are covered under the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
that “[t]his Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying 
purposes,” including the goal to “[s]upport the efforts of victims of domestic 
violence to avoid further abuse,” see 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/102 (2012), the court 
should not have interpreted dating relationship as serious courtship. The Act does 
not require a serious courtship or engagement or similar serious dating relationship. 
Id at 60/103(6). Arguably, any dating-based relationship should qualify given the 
language and purposes of the Act. Id. Some states’ statutes attempt to better define 
“dating relationship.” For example, Rhode Island requires a “significant and 
personal/intimate relationship,” R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-1(5) (2012), and Vermont 
requires a “social relationship of a romantic nature,” VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 
1101(2) (2010), and their statutes list the following for courts to consider: the nature 
and length of the relationship and frequency of interaction between the parties. The 
facts in Alison C. would probably not satisfy the statutory requirements in these 
states, but the Illinois statute does not use either of these definitions and simply 
distinguishes it from a casual or social acquaintance. 
29 This example was reported by a student observer of court proceedings during 
the period of the empirical study reported on in this Article. 
30 The Illinois Civil No Contact Order Act provides for protection in those 
seeking remedies but in non-relationship situations but to qualify for a Civil No 
Contact Order non-consensual sexual conduct or non-consensual sexual penetration 
by the respondent must have occurred. [I don’t understand that sentence at all. 
Maybe: The Illinois Civil No Contact Order Act provides protection for those 
seeking remedies in non-relationship situations. But to qualify for a Civil No 
Contact Order, there must be non-consensual sexual conduct or non-consensual 
sexual penetration by the respondent.]. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 22/201(a) and (b) 
(2012). Stalking that is not covered under the Act can qualify for a stalking no 
contact order under the Stalking No Contact Act. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 21 
(2012) (providing fewer remedies than the Act but prohibiting stalking or 
threatening to stalk, and providing a no contact type remedy, a stay away type 
remedy, a prohibition of possessing a FOID card or firearm, and “other injunctive 
relief”). 
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and household member relationship, allowing an order of protection, 
if required.31   
C. Available Remedies with an Order of Protection 
Many states, including Illinois, empower survivors to become 
safe and whole again by providing for remedies beyond simply 
prohibiting abuse or ordering the respondent to stay away. The Act 
includes a comprehensive set of remedies when orders of protection 
are obtained; up to nineteen remedies are available. Part II and Table 
2 present data on the extent to which these nineteen remedies have 
been sought by petitioners and granted by the judges.32 This subpart 
presents a brief overview of the nineteen remedies, identifying which 
remedies judges systematically refused to grant based on our data. 
From the data sample, most often petitioners sought and judges 
granted the following remedies: “Prohibition of abuse, neglect or 
exploitation,”33 “Grant of exclusive possession of residence,”34 “Stay 
away order and additional prohibitions,”35 and “Protection of 
property”36 (See Table 2 for the numbers sought and granted on each 
of these in our data sample). These four remedies cover the essence of 
what is typically sought in an order of protection: the abuse to stop; 
the respondent to stay away from the petitioner; protection of the 
petitioner’s property (e.g. car and cell phone); and, if the parties share 
a residence, for the petitioner to have exclusive right to that residence. 
Further, an “Order for injunctive relief”37 was also frequently sought 
and granted, empowering the court to order any other injunctive relief 
necessary or appropriate to prevent further abuse or effectuate one of 
the granted remedies. These orders are typically used to elaborate on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/103(6). 
32 See infra Table 2 for an enumeration of all nineteen remedies and numbers of 
each remedy sought and granted. 
33 See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214(b)(1) (2012). 
34 See id. at 60/214(b)(2).  
35 See id. at 60/214(b)(3). 
36 See id. at 60/214(b)(11).  
37 See id. at 60/214(b)(17). 
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the types of contact that are prohibited. They can expand upon the 
“stay away” order by warning respondents about specific prohibited 
conduct or modify the stay away remedy by permitting some contact. 
When children become protected parties to an order of protection with 
a stay away remedy, this prohibits all contact with the children. When 
the respondent is the parent of this child, the order for injunctive relief 
can clarify what types of contact would be permitted, for example, 
through supervised visitation. 
Petitioners also frequently sought and judges frequently granted 
certain remedies relating to children in common. These include 
“Physical care and possession of the minor child,”38 “Visitation,”39 
“Removal or concealment of minor child,”40 and “Prohibition of 
access to records.”41 These are important remedies because survivors 
of domestic violence are often afraid that abusive co-parents may take 
children away when the petitioner attempts to leave or keep children 
away for unwarranted periods of time. Indeed, abusers frequently 
threaten, often in an attempt to retain power and control. The 
petitioner may also fear that the respondent will abuse the children or 
use them as a means to continue the abuse. The order to prevent 
access to children’s school records may be particularly critical if the 
petitioner is in hiding from the abuser.42 Petitioners can use the 
“Visitation” order remedy to address their fear that the respondent 
will use visitation as a means to further abuse the petitioner, abuse the 
children, or act in a manner that is not in the children’s best interests. 
Petitioners can seek supervised visitation when there is concern that 
the child will be abused while under respondent’s care, or petitioners 
can request that third parties facilitate the exchange of the children to 
reduce contact between the parents. Although the Act permits 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Id. at 60/214(b)(5). This remedy also includes the remedy of ordering 
respondent to return a minor child to, or not remove a minor child from, the 
physical care of a parent or person in loco parentis. 
39 Id. at 60/214(b)(7). 
40 Id. at 60/214(b)(8). Violation of this remedy can lead to a criminal charge of 
child abduction. Id.  
41 Id. at 60/214(b)(15). 
42 See id. 
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visitation provisions to be addressed at the emergency order of 
protection stage ex parte, they are typically addressed at the plenary 
order of protection stage after the respondent has been served, so the 
respondent’s views can be heard and the parties can come to 
agreement. 
The “Order to appear”43 remedy was infrequently sought and 
never granted in the data sample, perhaps because pro se petitioners 
did not understand it as used in the statute. An order to appear is not 
an order for the respondent to appear in court to respond in general to 
allegations of abuse, but rather relates to appearing in court to return 
the child or inform the court as to where the child is in order to 
prevent abuse, removal, or concealment of children.  
This remedy is typically sought when petitioners know where 
the respondent is located but not where their children are located. 
Since this remedy is more limited in scope than what laypersons may 
think, it does not appear that judges inappropriately denied this 
remedy in the ninety-three cases. Yet, better educating petitioners 
about this remedy would be beneficial so that when this situation 
arises, petitioners will know of this solution as a possible means to 
recover their children.  
“Temporary legal custody”44 was less frequently requested in 
our data sample (requested in fifteen cases) than “Physical care and 
possession of the child”45 (requested in twenty-five cases). Further, 
courts appear to regularly grant temporary legal custody, granting it in 
five of the fifteen cases observed.46 Obtaining temporary legal custody 
is distinguishable from physical care and possession: the former 
focuses on decision-making and the latter on with whom the child 
primarily lives.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Id. at 60/214(b)(9). 
44 Id. at 60/214(b)(6). 
45 Id. at 60/214(b)(5). 
46 Table 1. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/212(b) (permitting courts that do not 
ordinarily handle matters of child custody or family support to “decline to decide 
contested issues of physical care, custody, visitation, or family support unless a 
decision on one or more of those contested issues is necessary to avoid the risk of 
abuse”).  
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A respondent may seek to retaliate against a petitioner for 
attempting to leave the respondent by changing aspects of how 
children are raised (e.g. taking children to church against the 
petitioner’s wishes and prior family practices). This remedy addresses 
such retaliation, and other forms of improper use of parental decision-
making by empowering petitioners to make major decisions regarding 
their children without first obtaining agreement from the respondent. 
Pro se petitioners should be better educated both on the benefits of 
this remedy and how to exercise it. For example, they must check this 
as a desired remedy in their petition for an emergency order of 
protection even though it is not an available remedy at the emergency 
order of protection stage, and then must raise it with the judge again 
at the plenary order of protection stage.  
In the Purposes section of the Act, the Illinois legislature 
specifically noted the importance of resolving “related issues of child 
custody and economic support, so that victims are not trapped in 
abusive situations by fear of retaliation, [or] loss of a child. . . .”47 
Consequently, it is worthwhile to take steps to improve petitioners’ 
abilities to seek this remedy and for judges to grant it when 
appropriate. 
Others, including children, can be added to the order of 
protection as a “protected person” if the person lives in the 
petitioner’s household, is a minor child or dependent adult in the 
petitioner’s care, is employed at the petitioner’s residence, or is an 
employee of a domestic violence program where a protected person 
resides.48 A child may qualify as a protected person even though she 
has not yet suffered abuse.49 This provision recognizes how an abuser 
may attempt to use or harm children in common with the survivor as a 
means to continue to harm the survivor. Respondents are required to 
comply with the order of protection as applied to the petitioner and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Id. at 60/102(4). 
48 Id. at 60/201(a)(i)-(iv). 
49 See In re Marriage of McCoy, 625 N.E. 2d 883, 886 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) 
(“Once one member of a household is abused, the court has maximum discretionary 
power to fashion the scope of an order of protection to include other household 
members or relatives who may be at risk of retaliatory acts by the abuser.”). 
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protected persons. When parents are respondents and their children 
are listed as protected persons, the court can create exceptions to stay 
away orders so that the respondent can retain the right to spend 
specific authorized time with his or her children—indeed one can 
provide for this in an order for injunctive relief.  
There are also several specialty remedies that can be useful in 
certain narrow situations. “Prohibition of entry” bars the respondent 
from entering the residence when intoxicated and “constitutes a threat 
to the safety and well-being of the petitioner or petitioner’s 
children.”50 This remedy is used when the petitioner does not want a 
general stay away, but only when the respondent is intoxicated. Our 
data sample demonstrates that judges are willing to grant this remedy; 
it was sought once and granted three times.  
Another specialty remedy, an “Order for payment of shelter 
services,” requires respondents to reimburse shelters that provide 
victims accommodations and counseling services.51 While it makes 
sense for respondents who have caused the need for these services to 
pay for them, it was sought in our data sample just once and not 
granted. This remedy presents practical problems because petitioners 
typically do not want respondents to know where they are, making 
petitioners unlikely to ask for this remedy when filing for an 
emergency order of protection. In addition, if recovered, it reduces the 
respondent’s resources to pay for support or losses to the petitioner, 
two other remedies available under the Act.  
A third specialty protection is for pet owners. Abusers 
sometimes threaten to harm or actually do harm survivors’ pets when 
she leaves. Survivors will stay with abusers out of concern for their 
pets. Thus, “Protection of animals”52 is an important remedy, but one 
which survivors of domestic violence may be unaware. No petitioners 
in our sample checked this box, but the court nonetheless granted this 
remedy in five cases.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214(b)(14). 
51 Id. at 60/214(b)(16). 
52 Id. at 60/214(b)(11.5). 
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While there is no evidence of judicial unwillingness to grant this 
remedy from our sample, the author learned from conversations with 
domestic violence advocates that some judges have declined to grant 
this remedy when the respondent, rather than the petitioner, is the one 
who purchased the pet. This practice is an incorrect application of the 
Act since this remedy does not require that the petitioner owns the 
pet, rather the remedy can be sought for pets “owned, possessed, 
leased, kept, or held by either the petitioner or the respondent or a 
minor child residing in the residence or household of either the 
petitioner or the respondent. . . .”53  
Another less frequently sought remedy is “Possession of 
personal property,” which grants a petitioner exclusive possession of 
enumerated personal property—e.g. a petitioner’s automobile or cell 
phone—and, if the respondent has possession or control, this order 
directs him to promptly transfer the property to the petitioner.54 
Obtaining this remedy at the emergency order of protection stage 
requires a petitioner to show either immediate, pressing need for the 
property, or that the respondent might improperly dispose of the 
property if notified that the petitioner is seeking this remedy.55 This 
remedy was sought in fourteen cases in our sample and granted in six.  
The four important remedies that judges systemically failed to 
grant even when properly sought (based on a review of affidavits and 
petitions, but not court transcripts) include: “Order of payment of 
losses,”56 “Order of payment of support,”57 “Counseling,”58 and 
“Prohibition of firearm possession.”59 Part III, infra, explains these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Id. (emphasis added). It could be that some trial judges are confusing the 
requirements for protection of animals with the requirements for protection of 
property, see id. at 60/214(11), or possession of personal property, see id. at 
60/214(10), which do require that the petitioner, not the respondent, own the 
property or, if they both own the property, requires a balance of hardship before 
granting the remedy. 
54 Id. at 60/214(b)(10). 
55 Id. at 60/217(a)(3)(iii). 
56 Id. at 60/214(b)(13). 
57 Id. at 60/214(b)(12). 
58 Id. at 60/214(b)(4). 
59 Id. at 60/214(b)(14.5). 
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critical remedies and analyzes possible reasons why judges fail to 
grant them. 
Before concluding this discussion of orders of protection, it is 
important to address what happens if the order is violated and 
partially address how a protective order, in some respects, is just a 
piece of paper. Fortunately, there are numerous consequences when 
an order is violated. Remedies can be enforced through civil contempt 
to coerce respondents to comply with orders, through criminal 
contempt to punish respondents for violations, or both.60 In addition, 
violations of certain remedies in Illinois can result in a criminal 
charge of a “Violation of an order of protection”61 and is a Class A 
Misdemeanor.62 To protect survivors from respondents charged with 
Violation of Order of Protection, the State can ask courts to assess 
risks of future violations and escalation of violence.63 Courts can use 
these risk assessments to justify ordering electronic surveillance of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 See id. at 60/223. 
61 In practice, sentences imposed for violations of orders of protection depend 
upon prior convictions on other criminal matters and the assessment of risk of 
substantial harm in the individual case. If assessment suggests low risk, defendants 
may simply receive supervision (which can be expunged), conditional discharge, or 
probation (during which defendants can be monitored for compliance with 
conditions such as attendance in intervention or substance abuse programs or 
electronic surveillance). Telephone Interview with Kelly Navarro, former Cook 
County Assistant State’s Attorney, (Aug. 20, 2013). Under the statute, when the 
following remedies have been violated, this violation can trigger criminal charges: 
Prohibition of abuse, neglect, or exploitation, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214(b)(1); 
Grant of exclusive possession of residence, id. at 60/214(b)(2); Stay away order and 
additional prohibitions, id. at 60/214(b)(3); Prohibition of entry (under the influence 
of drugs or alcohol), id. at 60/214(b)(14); Prohibition of firearm possession, id. at 
60/214(b)(14.5); or any other remedy when the action constitutes a crime against 
the protected party, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-30(a)(1)(i) (2012). If respondents 
intentionally conceal, detain, or remove children from the state in violation of 
remedies granting petitioners physical care or possession, or both of the child or in 
violation of remedies of temporary legal custody (or intentionally concealing or 
removing children in violation of remedies prohibiting such conduct) this is a Class 
4 felony, carrying a penalty of up to one to three years. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-
4.5-45. 
62 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-3.4.  
63 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/110-5 (2012). 
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defendants as a condition of bond64 or courts can do so after 
conviction in certain scenarios.65 Originally, laws that provide for 
electronic surveillance of those charged or convicted of Violation of 
Order of Protection mandated risk assessments, and electronic 
surveillance could be required depending on the outcome of that risk 
assessment. Later modifications have now made the assessments 
discretionary due to costs and feasibility of implementation.66 
After focusing on the many ways that orders of protection and 
the Act are geared towards helping protect survivors of domestic 
violence, it should be noted that the Act also contains provisions 
focused on addressing the interests of those accused of abuse. These 
include provisions that attempt to reduce false accusations, provide a 
swift opportunity to appear in court to contest the allegations of 
abuse, and to, at times, balance the petitioner’s needs with the 
respondent’s.67  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Id.  
65 After conviction, defendants can be placed under electronic surveillance: as a 
condition of probation or conditional discharge, 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-6-
3(b)(10)(iii) (2012), or as a mandatory condition of early release from prison when 
the inmate has received good conduct credit, id. at 5/3-6-3(f). 
66 See Bryan Thompson, Changes in the Cindy Bischof Law, 24 J. DUPAGE 
COUNTY B. ASS’N, Oct. 2011 at 40, available at 
http://www.dcbabrief.org/vol241011art4.html.  
67 The Act includes provisions that address fairness issues for respondents 
accused of committing abuse under the Act, including: requiring that evidence of 
immediate danger of further abuse to the petitioner outweighs the hardship to the 
respondent before imposing the remedy of exclusive possession of the home at an 
ex parte emergency order of protection, see 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/217(a)(3)(i); 
allowing a respondent subject to an ex parte emergency order of protection or 
interim order of protection to appear and petition the court to rehear the original or 
amended petition two days, or a shorter period as the court may prescribe, after 
giving notice to the petitioner (in addition, if contesting a grant of exclusive 
possession of the home to the petitioner, the court must set a court date for a hearing 
within fourteen days), see id. at 60/224; if a party makes allegations without 
reasonable cause that are found to be untrue, this will subject the party pleading 
them to the payment of reasonable expenses actually incurred by the other party 
plus reasonable attorney’s fee on motion made within thirty days of the judgment or 
dismissal and potential prosecution for perjury, id. at 60/226. In addition, as 
discussed in Part III, infra, in order to obtain an ex parte emergency order of 
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II. DATA COLLECTION AND FINDINGS 
This Part analyzes data collected from a court-monitoring 
project followed by case file review for cases that took place at the 
specialized domestic violence law court at 555 West Harrison Street 
in Chicago, Illinois. The goal of the study was to determine how well 
the court protects survivors of domestic violence. The study focused 
mainly on how well the judges apply the Act in order of protection 
cases they hear,68 and in particular, whether judges grant the full range 
of remedies petitioners seek, when appropriate. 
A. Method of Collecting the Case File Data 
Researchers collected data from court cases in three phases. In 
Phase I, four researchers observed the civil court call for orders of 
protection from approximately October through December of 2011, 
and recorded basic information about each case (e.g. who was present 
and whether an emergency order of protection or a plenary order of 
protection was issued).69 The researchers attended a total of 217 cases 
during the afternoon court sessions, when petitions for ex parte 
emergency order of protection70 are typically heard, and during the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
protection that awards certain remedies such as “prohibition of abuse,” the statute in 
Section 60/217(a)(3)(i) requires that the court determine that “the harm which that 
remedy is intended to prevent would be likely to occur if the respondent were given 
any prior notice, or greater notice than was actually given, of the petitioner’s efforts 
to obtain judicial relief.” This standard was referred to in Sanders v. Shephard as 
“exigent circumstances.” 541 N.E. 2d 1150, 1155 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989). 
68 The author also wanted to see if the presence of an attorney for petitioner or 
respondent affected the outcome in the case (i.e. whether it led to more or fewer 
order of protections being granted), but so few petitioners and respondents were 
represented in the data sample, that the author was unable to find a statistically 
significant result from this factor.  
69 Researchers observing the civil court call used a Court Monitoring Form to 
record their observations, on file with the author. 
70 An emergency order of protection under the Act is an order that can be 
granted at an ex parte hearing that can result in an order of protection that can last 
up to twenty-one days (the return date for the hearing for a plenary order of 
protection) to provide time to serve the respondent. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/220(a) 
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morning court call, when plenary order of protection71 hearings tended 
to take place. There are two courtrooms where judges hear these cases 
and the researchers observed one of the two courtrooms randomly 
each time. More information about these cases was collected in Phase 
II, approximately three months later,72 because very limited kinds of 
information could be obtained through court observations.73 
In Phase II, researchers reviewed the court files from the 
monitored cases. For a variety of reasons, the files from some of the 
monitored cases could not be located,74 leaving ninety-three cases for 
analysis.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(2012). The emergency order of protection can be continued at each hearing date as 
necessary to obtain service of the respondent. Id. at 60/213(b).  
71 A plenary order of protection under the Act is an order that can be granted at a 
hearing after the respondent has been served with the emergency order of protection 
(through personal service or service by publication; if service is by publication and 
the respondent has no actual knowledge of the plenary order of protection then if 
they violate the plenary order of protection they cannot be criminally liable for the 
crime of violating the plenary order of protection). Id. at 60/223(a)(1). The plenary 
order of protection can run for a period up to two years. Id. at 60/220(b).  
72 In some cases observed, the case was at a status stage and even when an 
emergency or plenary order hearing was taking place, the researchers had difficulty 
at times hearing what the parties and judge were saying. It is a common practice of 
the judges to read through very quickly their finding of abuse and what remedies 
they are granting. 
73 The cases observed happened quickly. It was often difficult to hear what the 
judges, parties, and any witnesses or attorneys were saying. In addition, one gets 
only a “snap-shot” of the case through a random court-monitoring project. For 
example, the case being observed might only be on a “return date” after an 
emergency order of protection has been issued, to see if the respondent has been 
served or not. Thus, to gain a better sense of what has been alleged in the case, and 
what remedies the petitioners sought, it was necessary to review the case file 
containing the petitioner’s petition for an emergency order of protection and 
affidavit. Because it can take several attempts to serve the respondent and the case 
may be continued for other reasons, it is also useful to review the case file more 
than once to see what has developed in the case.  
74 Some of these were due to lack of sufficient information in the court 
monitoring forms. Cases that involved civil no contact orders or stalking no contact 
orders (cases where there was not the “family or household member relationship” 
required for an order of protection) were also excluded. This reduced the number of 
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The researchers recorded which remedies were sought and 
granted, whether judges correctly applied the law, and updates to the 
status of these ninety-three cases. In particular, researchers reviewed 
the petition and affidavit for an order of protection and the actual 
order of protection itself (when granted) in the court file, 
supplemented the court monitoring forms with certain additional 
information,75 and made any corrections or updates.76  
Finally, in Phase III, between August 2012 and January 2013, 
approximately one year after the cases were first observed, an 
additional researcher reviewed the ninety-three case files to ensure the 
accuracy of the information collected, further update the status of the 
cases, and analyze how well the judges were applying the Act in the 
cases before them. 
The researcher analyzed how the judge acted by examining the 
total number of remedies sought, granted, and denied against the fact 
patterns suggesting the applicability of certain remedies in certain fact 
patterns,77 inspecting whether the judges filled in Paragraph 18 of the 
form specifying reasons for the denial of remedies when the judge had 
granted an order of protection but denied one or more of the sought 
remedies (filling in Paragraph 18 under this circumstance is a 
requirement under the Act, but many judges failed to comply), and 
identifying the time frame in each of the cases, specifically examining 
the time from the last abusive incident to when the petitioner sought 
the emergency order of protection. The results of this review are 
detailed in Table 1 and Table 2 of the Appendix and summarized 
below. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
cases to ninety-three. All ninety-three remaining case files were reviewed by at least 
two researchers for accuracy. The results are presented in Table 1. 
75 Researchers reviewing the case files also collected data on the correlation 
between petitioners dropping their cases and the number of continuances in the 
dropped case due to failure to serve the respondent.  
76 The Court Monitoring Form and the form used to update the Court Monitoring 
Form are on file with the author. 
77 One example of a fact pattern identified was the remedy of relinquishment of 
firearms when the facts in the affidavit noted the possession of firearms by a 
respondent and the respondent’s threat to use them against the petitioner. 
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B. Summary of the Key Findings from the Case File Review 
Generally, the judges in the specialized court effectively 
implemented the Act’s goals. Perhaps the best objective indicator of 
this proposition is that 81% of petitioners who sought an emergency 
order of protection received one, even though 80% of the petitioners 
acted pro se. Although 53% of the ninety-three cases did not result in 
a plenary order of protection, only 26% of those case denials were 
based upon judicial denial of a plenary order of protection after a 
hearing.78 In addition, researchers’ evaluations of the judges were 
quite positive.79 The judges were typically very patient and helpful 
towards the pro se litigants,80 generally able to extract from the pro se 
petitioner the proper pleaded facts for an order of protection, and 
appeared to properly apply the Act in the vast majority of observed 
cases.  
Notwithstanding these positives, the review of the ninety-three 
cases found evidence of three very serious problems with judicial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 See infra Table 1. 
79 Judges and court administrators were aware of the court-monitoring project 
and the presence of the researchers and so their handling of the cases may have been 
affected by their presence. 
80 Researchers noted statements and helpful legal explanations made by the 
judges intended to aid pro se parties: (i) explaining the burden of proof, the need to 
state facts not conclusions, providing information on return dates and the need to 
come to court prepared for the hearing, (ii) explaining certain legal phrases and 
concepts when the parties appeared not to understand them, such as what is “abuse” 
under the Act (reading out loud relevant portions of the definition), what it means to 
establish paternity and what is hearsay, and (iii) directing the petitioner to let the 
judge know if she feared for her safety while in court, warning the parties not to 
speak with each other and instructing the respondent not to sit next to the petitioner. 
While the judges under observation typically exhibited excellent patience, kindness, 
and helpfulness towards the pro se parties, researchers also observed, at times, 
judges who failed to exhibit respect towards a party. Negative comments included: 
(i) judges read through the order too quickly and (ii) some judges immediately 
dismissed cases if the petitioner was not present the very moment the case was 
announced, even when they had stepped outside of the courtroom in order to attend 
to a child needing their attention in the hallway. Judges could instead re-call at the 
end of the court call those cases where the petitioner had stepped out momentarily 
when the case was called.   
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implementation of the Act and a fourth problem relating to the large 
percentage of pro se petitioners. First, judges completely failed to 
comply with the Act’s requirement to specify in writing the reasons 
for denying a remedy, even though the form order of protection 
(Paragraph 18) called for this information. Second, judges refused to 
grant the remedies of payment of child and spousal support, payment 
of losses, relinquishment of firearms, and counseling, even when 
sought and when the facts in the affidavit and petition supported such 
relief under the terms of the Act.81 Third, judges’ denial rates were 
nearly double for emergency order of protection when the last 
incident of abuse occurred more than seven days before the petitioner 
appeared in court seeking the emergency order of protection (23% 
versus 12%), suggesting that judges apply a major burden on 
petitioners to explain a delay in seeking an emergency order of 
protection even though there is no such temporal requirement in the 
Act for an emergency order of protection.82 Finally, a very large 
percentage of petitioners (80%) and respondents (97%) acted pro se in 
these cases83 and many petitioners failed to seek remedies that they 
appeared to be entitled to and from which they could have 
benefitted.84  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 See infra Table 3. 
82 The author sent a survey in March 2013, to twenty-seven organizations 
located in Chicago, Illinois, and a nearby suburb, who represent or otherwise assist 
survivors of domestic violence (the “Service Organization Survey”). Question 3 of 
the Service Organization Survey asked if they ever observed a judge state that he or 
she would not grant an emergency order of protection because the last incident of 
abuse took place “too long ago” in the court’s judgment, and if yes, how many 
times they observed this happen. Eight of the nine organizations that turned in 
completed surveys reported observing this. Of the eight that observed this, one 
reported “countless” times, one reported that he “[did] not know the number of 
times,” one reported four times over the past month, one reported twenty-four times 
[over the last month], and three reported between three and five times [over the last 
month]. Service Organization Survey (March 2013) (on file with author). 
83 See infra Table 1. 
84 See infra Table 3. In a few of the observed cases, the petitioner was seriously 
disadvantaged in obtaining any type of order of protection because an attorney did 
not represent her. In one case, for example, the order of protection was denied 
because the petitioner had not been able to meet, to the judge’s satisfaction, the 
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Finally, a non-judicial problem with the implementation of the 
Act, reflected in the data collected, is that petitioners in 55% of the 
cases dropped their case after receiving an emergency order of 
protection. In 38% of these cases, the petitioner dropped the case after 
it had previously been continued for failure to serve the respondent. 
This indicates a connection among failure to obtain service, a need to 
continue the case as a consequence, and a substantial percentage of 
petitioners dropping their cases after one or more such continuances. 
III. ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This Part focuses on the problem areas with the judicial 
application of the Act described in Part II. It explores how judicial 
practice diverges from the Act’s requirements, possible reasons for 
this divergence, and steps that can be taken to address it. Finally, Part 
III considers the special challenges to full implementation of the Act 
given that 81% of petitioners and 97% of respondents are pro se, and 
many such petitioners fail to seek potentially beneficial remedies to 
which they are entitled.  
A. Failure or Refusal to Grant the Remedy of Payment of Support: 
Sought in only three cases and not granted in any of the ninety-
three cases 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“relationship” requirement. The judge in that observed cased noted that one month 
of dating is not “dating” for purposes of the Act, even though there is no such time 
length requirement in the Act. If represented, the attorney could have raised this 
point. In some instances, the petitioner clearly alleged the statutorily required 
“abuse,” testifying that the respondent struck the petitioner, causing scratches and 
bruising, meeting the definition of “physical abuse” under the Act. The petitioner 
also alleged that the respondent held a gun to the petitioner’s head and then shot a 
bullet from the gun into a wall of the petitioner’s home which went through her 
daughter’s room, meeting the definition of “harassment” and “intimidation of a 
dependent” under the Act. Yet the judge ruled there was “insufficient evidence of 
physical abuse” and denied an order of protection. It is possible that the judge ruled 
this way because the judge did not believe the petitioner’s testimony or additional 
testimony or evidence offered through the petitioner’s pleadings.  
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The “Order for payment of support” is an order that requires the 
respondent to pay temporary support for the petitioner or any child in 
the petitioner’s care or custody when the respondent has a legal 
obligation to support that person under the Illinois Marriage and 
Dissolution of Marriage Act. The Marriage and Dissolution of 
Marriage Act governs the amount of such support and the means by 
which the support is effectuated.85 This order “may be granted only if 
the respondent has been personally served with process, has answered 
or has made a general appearance.”86 The order cannot be granted on 
an emergency order of protection.87  
 The order for payment of support appears, at first blush, to be 
primarily financial in nature—the payment of money in certain 
circumstances—rather than focused on safety. Some judges may 
believe that only matters of safety should be handled in a court that 
handles orders of protection, and thusly, do not readily grant this 
remedy.  
In reality, financial remedies are necessary for a survivor’s 
ability to safely leave an abuser. Thus, financial remedies can be as 
much a safety issue as a stay away order.88 Indeed, the Illinois 
legislature recognized the importance of payment of support by 
stating, among the purposes of the Act, “more appropriately 
protecting and assisting victims” and preventing further abuse by 
addressing “related issues of child custody and economic support, so 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214(b)(12) (2012).  
86 Id. at 60/210(d).  
87 Id. at 60/217(a)(3)(iii). 
88 See, e.g., Economic Justice and Domestic Violence, FAM. VIOLENCE 
PREVENTION FUND (Oct. 17, 2007), 
http://web.archive.org/web/20071017202435/http://endabuse.org/programs/display.
php3?DocID=304 (showing a lack of income is a common reason cited by survivors 
of domestic violence for staying in abusive relationships). Indeed, the abuse itself is 
a major cause of creating financial dependence on the abuser. See generally Angela 
M. Moe & Myrtle P. Bell, Abject Economics: The Effects of Battering on Women's 
Work and Employability, 10 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 29 (2004), available at 
http://works.bepress.com/angela_moe/10.  
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that victims are not trapped in abusive situations . . . by . . . financial 
dependence. . . .”89  
Yet, some judges have expressed reluctance to grant the 
payment of support remedy because they do not want petitioners to be 
able to “misuse” the court as a means for a “cheap divorce.”90 Even 
when the respondent previously agreed to pay support, some judges 
are still reluctant to order support because a violation of the order can 
result in a possible contempt sanction.91 Petitioners only sought 
payment of support in three of the ninety-three cases, and judges 
never granted it.  
Some attorneys and advocates who work with survivors of 
domestic violence are generally concerned that if they push for more 
remedies, including remedies like financial support, they might 
jeopardize the granting of an emergency order of protection. This is a 
troubling concern and may explain why only three petitioners sought 
this remedy. The fact that this remedy cannot be granted at the 
emergency order of protection stage may also explain why some pro 
se petitioners failed to seek it. Court clerks may be informing 
petitioners that this remedy is not available at the emergency order of 
protection stage but may not be explaining that to seek this remedy at 
the plenary order of protection stage, they need to include the remedy 
in their initial petition.  
In addition, in order to recover temporary child support, the 
petitioner needs to know how to present evidence of the respondent’s 
net income under the Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act.92 
The petitioner also may need to provide evidence of the respondent’s 
parental status towards the child under Illinois law.93 Although the 
law relating to child support in Illinois is relatively straightforward, 
presenting evidence on net income and parental status of the 
petitioner may be difficult for pro se petitioners without assistance.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/102(4). 
90 Interview with confidential party, in Chi., Ill. (2014). 
91 Id. 
92 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/505. 
93 Id. 
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Conversely, temporary support for the petitioner is less clear 
under the Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act.  The pro se 
petitioner would need even more assistance in seeking this remedy 
because it is more difficult to qualify for and obtain spousal support. 
Although spousal support is generally less likely to be pursued, it 
should be pursued when the petitioner requires this assistance to 
become financially independent but does not desire to file a divorce 
action right away.  
Due to the clear intent of the Illinois legislature to provide 
survivors with this financial remedy as a part of the plenary order of 
protection, it is important that survivors of domestic violence are 
empowered to seek financial remedies. Petitioners should not be 
intimidated into disregarding it due to confusion over presenting 
appropriate evidence, nor due to a fear of backlash from the judge in 
obtaining an emergency order of protection if the financial remedy is 
checked off in her petition.  
Forms should be created that inform petitioners about the types 
of evidence necessary to obtain these remedies. Further, judges should 
be trained to grant payment of support when petitioners provide 
proper evidence.94  
Section 60/212(b) of the Act provides that judges should not 
decline hearing child support or temporary spousal support in the 
context of a plenary order of protection, even if the judge does not 
ordinarily hear this type of matter, if the remedy is necessary to avoid 
further abuse.95 If the court determines the remedy is not necessary to 
avoid further abuse and declines to grant the remedy, then the court 
must transfer all undecided issues to the appropriate court or division 
and cannot delay or decline from ruling on the other issues. This 
section may partially explain why so few petitioners in the data 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Educational and training materials on how to lay a foundation for the remedies 
of payment of support, payment of losses, temporary legal custody, and 
relinquishment of possession of firearms are located at Domestic Violence Clinic, J. 
MARSHALL L. SCH., www.jmls.edu/clinics/domestic-violence/public.php (last 
visited Jan. 19, 2015). 
95 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/212(b). 
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sample sought payment of support, and even when they did, why so 
few judges granted the remedy of support.  
Child support and spousal support ordinarily take place in the 
context of a divorce or parentage case. However, many petitioners 
have sought and been granted the “Physical Care and Possession of 
the minor child” remedy, which is also covered by section 60/212(b). 
This dichotomy raises the following question: why do judges seem 
much more receptive to handling the care of children remedy than the 
payment of support remedy?  
Perhaps judges are better able to see the connection to safety 
matters for the former over the latter. In exacerbation of the problem, 
it appears that after observing repeated denial of payment of support 
remedies, lawyers and advocates now do not seek the remedy of 
payment of support, even when their clients could benefit from this 
remedy.96 
B. Failure or Refusal to Grant the Remedy of Payment of Losses: 
Sought in only two cases and not granted in any of the ninety-
three cases 
The “Order for payment of losses” provides for three categories 
of losses that survivors face. First, it allows compensation for losses 
they may have suffered due to the abuse, including medical expenses, 
lost earnings, repair or replacement of damaged or stolen property, 
reasonable attorney’s fees, court costs, and moving or other travel 
expenses, including reasonable costs of temporary shelter and 
restaurant meals.97 Second, it allows compensation for appropriate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 In confidential conversations by the author with lawyers and domestic 
advocates, several reasons were raised for not seeking the payment of support 
remedy when obtaining an order of protection: at the time, it was not being granted 
by the judges, fear of backlash from a judge who might view the petitioner as less 
credible about the abuse when the petitioner was seeking monetary remedies too, 
fear of backlash from the respondent who might become more violent when this 
remedy is pursued, and goal of the petitioner to have no further contact with the 
respondent including through implementing this remedy. 
97 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214(b)(13). 
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temporary relief, which would, consequently, address some of the 
family needs to break away from financial dependence on abusers.98 
Third, it allows for the reimbursement of the costs of recovering 
children if they have been removed or concealed.99 Without these 
remedies, survivors may be unable to safely and successfully separate 
from their abusers. Similar to the order for payment of support, the 
order for payment of losses can only be granted if the respondent has 
been personally served with process, and has answered or has made a 
general appearance.100 Additionally, the order for payment of losses is 
not available on an emergency order of protection101 and is 
enforceable through civil or criminal contempt.  
Considering how important and useful this remedy can be, it is 
disappointing to see that only two of the ninety-three petitioners 
sought it. Similar to the remedy of payment of support, some 
petitioners may mistakenly fail to check this off as a desired remedy 
in their petition for an emergency order of protection, a precondition 
to then being able to seek the remedy after service of the respondent 
at the hearing for a plenary order of protection. Petitioners may also 
consciously decide not to do so due to fear of enraging respondents or 
because respondents may lack the resources to pay these losses. 
Alternatively, petitioners may fear that in seeking this remedy judges 
will perceive the petitioners as prioritizing financial assistance 
compared to the petitioner’s safety concerns, and consequently deny 
the orders of protection.  Attorneys of survivors raised this as a 
concern.102  
While some judges tell petitioners to seek this remedy in a small 
claims court rather than in the order of protection proceeding, this is 
incorrect under the Act. Only remedies relating to child custody and 
family support are matters that judges can decline hearing, and then 
only when these remedies are not linked to preventing future abuse.103 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Id. at 60/214(b)(13)(i). 
99 Id. at 60/214(b)(13)(ii). 
100 Id. at 60/210(d). 
101 See id.  
102 See supra note 96.  
103 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/212(b). 
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Pursuant to Section 212(b) of the Act, judges are supposed to then 
transfer that issue to another court.104 
Judges should be trained to grant payment of losses when the 
petitioner seeks it and provides evidence of losses recoverable under 
section 214(b)(13) of the Act.105 Attorneys should appeal cases where 
judges incorrectly deny this remedy. Furthermore, if judges deny 
orders of protection as a negative reaction to petitioners also seeking 
this remedy, an attorney on behalf of the petitioner should move for 
reconsideration, and if not granted, should appeal the decision. When 
appealing denials, petitioners can cite to the Illinois Appellate Court 
in Best v. Best: “[T]he central inquiry [for an order of protection] is 
whether the petitioner has been abused. Indeed, under section 214(a) 
of the Domestic Violence Act, once the trial court finds that the 
petitioner has been abused, ‘an order of protection. . . shall issue.’”106  
Although having no order of protection during the appeals 
process can leave some survivors in dangerous situations, which 
explains why some advocates and attorneys fear to seek the payment 
of losses remedy, other safety measures can and should be taken. Due 
to the time-sensitive nature of the relief sought and the possibility of 
delays in obtaining an order of protection, denials can be deadly.  
Therefore, the Illinois legislature should amend the Act—and 
other state legislatures amend their comparable legislation—to 
provide for an expedited appeals process for denials of emergency 
orders of protection. If denials occur at the plenary order of protection 
stage, petitioners can move for stays of the denial pending appeal, so 
that the prior emergency order of protection remains in place. Finally, 
if after training on this remedy, judges continue to rule 
inappropriately, the presiding judge should consider using her 
authority under Supreme Court Rule 21(g) to address judges’ failures 
to perform their duties.107 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104  Id.  
105 Id. at 60/214(b)(13). 
106 860 N.E. 2d 240, 244 (Ill. 2006) (quoting 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214(a)) 
(emphasis in original). 
107 See infra Part III.E.  
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C. Failure or Refusal to Grant the Remedy of Relinquishment of 
Firearms: Sought in eleven cases and not granted in any of the 
ninety-three cases 
The final remedy that the judges failed to grant is “Prohibition 
of firearm possession.” This remedy is critical because abuse is much 
more likely to become lethal when abusers possess firearms.108 The 
Act is clear that when certain standards are met, judges must order 
respondents to relinquish firearms and Firearm Owner Identification 
(FOID) cards.109 
Notwithstanding the mandatory language in the Act, judges in 
the study systemically refused to grant this remedy. Perhaps this is 
because the statute is unclear as to who should seize the firearms, 
whether sheriffs or police could search respondents’ persons or homes 
for the firearms, and the process and timing by which respondents 
should turn over firearms and FOID cards. The comparable statute in 
California includes many more details on how relinquishment should 
take place. The California statute imposes duties on respondents to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 See, e.g., Jacquelyn C. Campbell et al., Risk Factors for Femicide in Abusive 
Relationships: Results From a Multisite Case Control Study, 93 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 1089 (2003); see also Benjamin Thomas Greer & Jeffrey G. Purvis, Judges 
Going Rogue: Constitutional Implications When Mandatory Firearm Restrictions 
Are Removed From Domestic Violence Restraining Orders, 26 WIS. J.L. GENDER & 
SOC’Y 275, 281 (2011) (proper application of firearm restrictions produced an 8% 
decrease in the rate of intimate partner violence homicide) (citing Daniel W. 
Webster et al., Women with Protective Orders Report Failure to Remove Firearms 
from their Abusive Partners: Results from an Exploratory Study, 19 J. WOMEN’S 
HEALTH 93, 93 (2010)). Also recognizing the connection between possession of a 
firearm and heightened risk for lethality, under the Illinois Firearm Owner’s 
Identification Act, 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 65/2(a)(1) (2012), in order to lawfully 
possess a firearm, a person (except for police in their official duties) must have a 
valid FOID card issued by the Illinois State Police. Further, officials must deny an 
application for a FOID card by anyone subject to an order of protection, and 
officials must revoke and seize a previously issued FOID card by anyone subject to 
an order of protection Id. at 65/8.2 (2012).  
109 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214(b)(14.5) (2013). At the time the empirical study 
was conducted, 60/214(b)(14.5) used the phrase “shall” repeatedly. Since then, 
Section 60/214(b)(14.5) has been amended. See P.A. 97-1150 signed into law on 
Jan. 25, 2013, and codified at 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 60/214. 
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file with the court a receipt showing that firearms should be either 
surrendered to local law enforcement or sold to licensed gun dealers 
within forty-eight hours after being served.110  Failure to do so 
constitutes a violation of the order of protection.111  
As amended in January 2013, the relinquishment of firearms 
remedy is no longer available at the emergency order of protection 
stage.112 The standard for issuing the remedy also changed.113 It now 
mirrors the language in federal laws relating to orders of protection 
barring possession of firearms and is confined to situations where the 
petitioner is an intimate partner of the respondent or the child of such 
an intimate partner.114 However, the mandatory language requiring a 
court to order the seizure of any firearm in the possession of the 
respondent is retained,115 as is the mandatory language for the court to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 CAL. FAM. CODE § 6389(c)(2) (West 2013).  
111 Id. Sections (3) and (4) contain other useful aspects of implementing the 
relinquishment of firearms relating to specifying the known location and types of 
firearms and providing courts with the discretion to grant a use immunity for 
relinquishing firearms if the respondent asserts the right against self-incrimination 
when declining to relinquish possession. See id. § 6389(c)(3)-(4). 
112 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214(b)(14.5)(a)(1) (2012) (“Prohibit a respondent 
against whom an order of protection was issued from possessing any firearms 
during the duration of the order if the order: (1) was issued after a hearing of which 
such person received actual notice, and at which such person had an opportunity to 
participate”).  
113 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214(b)(14.5)(a)(2) (2012). To obtain this remedy 
against a respondent, it is necessary that the order of protection restrains such 
person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner of such person or 
child of such intimate partner or person, or engaging in other conduct that would 
place an intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child; 
and (3)(i) includes a finding that such person represents a credible threat to the 
physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or (ii) by its terms explicitly 
prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against such 
intimate partner or child that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury. 
Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. “The court shall issue a warrant for seizure of any firearm in the 
possession of the respondent, to be kept by the local law enforcement agency for 
safekeeping, except as provided in subsection (b). Id. (emphasis added). If the 
respondent is a police officer, subsection (b) provides that the weapon is 
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order forfeiture of any FOID.116 Violating this remedy constitutes the 
crime of violating an order of protection, making the respondent 
subject to arrest.117  
The process for informing the court and petitioner when and 
whether the firearms were turned over or seized is not uniform. 
Further, petitioners could contact law enforcement to inquire, but 
currently there is no requirement in place to communicate this 
information to the petitioner or even to the court. Illinois law should 
be amended to require that this information be provided to the court 
by law enforcement or the sheriff’s office that seized the weapons 
under the order. This information should also be made available in the 
case file for petitioners to review within forty-eight hours of any such 
seizure or relinquishment so that the petitioner knows whether this 
safety measure has taken place. Section 14.5 should be amended to 
require respondents to relinquish their firearms within forty-eight 
hours of service of their order and provide evidence of relinquishment 
to the court, as required in California. Courts could then determine 
whether respondents have complied—with a rebuttable presumption 
of non-compliance if evidence is not received within forty-eight 
hours—thereby aiding petitioners’ safety. 
Some judges may refuse to grant this remedy due to the 
difficulty of monitoring and enforcing compliance even when they 
recognize the risks to the survivor’s safety. Others may see this as a 
Second Amendment issue, even though federal case law does not 
support a constitutional challenge.118 Because this remedy is so 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
surrendered to the chief law enforcement executive of the agency in which the 
respondent is employed, who retains it for safekeeping for the duration of the order 
of protection. Id. at 214(b)(14.5)(b). 
116 “Any Firearm Owner’s Identification Card in the possession of the 
respondent, except as provided in subsection (b), shall be ordered by the court to be 
turned over to the local law enforcement agency.” Id. (emphasis added).  
117 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-3.4.  
118 See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F. 3d 933, 939-40 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing United 
States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 643-44 (7th Cir. 2010) (ruling certain Illinois 
firearm laws, not including the Act, to be unconstitutional, but distinguishing the 
situation where a person is convicted of the misdemeanor crime of domestic battery 
as the basis for prohibiting possession of a firearm)). 
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critical to protecting some survivors of domestic violence, judges 
should be instructed to grant the remedy when the statutory conditions 
for relinquishment of firearms have been met. 
D. Failure or Refusal to Grant the Remedy of Counseling: Sought in 
nineteen cases and granted in only two of the ninety-three cases 
Because some petitioners desire to remain with their intimate 
partners, but in safer, healthier relationships,119 the Illinois legislature 
provided not only for a stop the abuse remedy but also an order for 
the respondent to attend counseling. One form of counseling available 
under this remedy is “an Illinois Department of Human Services 
protocol approved partner abuse intervention program” where the 
respondent would go “for an assessment and to follow all 
recommended treatment.”120 Other potential forms of counseling 
available under this remedy include alcohol or substance abuse 
counseling, as well as other guidance services as the court deems 
appropriate.121 While data on the success of various counseling and 
partner abuse intervention programs is mixed, some abusive partners 
benefit from various forms of counseling and partner abuse 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 Comments of Representative Greiman, 82d Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess., at 90-
91 (Ill. May 6, 1981), available at 
http://www.ilga.gov/house/transcripts/htrans82/HT050681.pdf (“[I]n the end this 
Bill gives people an opportunity to stay together, to not get a divorce. . . most of 
these remedies, many of them could be handled in a divorce setting. This gives them 
an opportunity to try and stay in their situation without getting a divorce.” This 
appears to explain why at least some legislators wanted the remedy of counseling 
included in the original bill passed back in 1981.). 
120 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214(b)(4). 
121 Id. The counseling under Section (b)(4) should not be the typical form of 
“couple’s counseling” that takes place when a couple is experiencing normal 
difficulties and where there will be no acts of intimidation and retaliation when both 
spouses discuss the problems in the relationship, but instead needs to be tailored to 
the power and control dynamics of intimate partner abuse, which under current 
thinking, is performed with partner abuse intervention programs. Mike Feinerman, 
Co-Ex. Dir., Certified Partner Abuse Intervention Partners, Address at the John 
Marshall Sch. of Law: Working with People Who Batter: Parenting After Domestic 
Violence (Mar. 26, 2013) (presentation material on file with author). 
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intervention programs.122 Thus, this is an important remedy not only 
for petitioners who seek to safely remain in a relationship, but also for 
society as a whole, since successful intervention can reduce future 
abuse with other partners.  
This is also a critical remedy for children common to the 
petitioner and respondent. Due to the severe emotional harm children 
may experience from observing domestic violence, it is beneficial for 
the order of protection to include the remedy of counseling. If the 
respondent has a child in common with the petitioner, there will be 
continuing contact between the co-parents and further abuse could 
occur in front of the child. This remedy seeks to prevent further abuse 
through proactive counseling.   
Like orders for payment of support and payment of losses, 
counseling is not allowed on an emergency order of protection.123 It 
can only be granted when the respondent has been served and the 
respondent answered or made a general appearance.124 The remedy is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 The organization that created the Duluth model (which is the most widely-
adopted approach for court-mandated batterer intervention programs), reported that 
in a study of men who pass through their program and the criminal justice system, 
68% have not reappeared in the criminal justice system over a course of eight years. 
Why the Duluth Model Works, HOME OF THE DULUTH MODEL, 
http://www.theduluthmodel.org/about/why-works.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2015). 
But see Julia C. Babcock, Charles E. Green, & Chet Robie, Does Batterers’ 
Treatment Work? A Meta-analytic Review of Domestic Violence Treatment, 23 
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 1023 (2004) (discussing how current interventions, 
including the Duluth Model, have a minimal impact on reducing recidivism beyond 
the effect of being arrested). According to the Center for Advancing Domestic 
Peace—an organization located in Chicago, Illinois—when the person who is 
attending a partner abuse intervention program has more to lose if arrested for a 
domestic violence-related crime (for example, the person has a good job), the 
person is more likely to benefit from the program and less likely to re-abuse, even if 
the person initially does not want to be in the program. LARRY BENNETT ET AL., 
PROGRAM COMPLETION, BEHAVIORAL CHANGE, AND RE-ARREST FOR THE 
BATTERER INTERVENTION SYSTEM OF COOK COUNTY ILLINOIS 4 (Feb. 14, 2005), 
available at 
http://www.icjia.state.il.us/public/pdf/ResearchReports/CookCountyDVInt.pdf. 
123 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/217(a)(3) (2012). 
124 Id. at 60/210(d). 
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enforced through civil or criminal contempt.125 While this remedy is 
not available at the emergency order of protection stage, a petitioner 
still must check this remedy off in their petition for an emergency 
order of protection in order to be able to obtain it at the plenary order 
of protection stage. Unfortunately, some pro se petitioners may fail to 
check off that they are seeking this remedy in their initial petition at 
the emergency order of protection stage if they are informed that they 
cannot get this remedy at that stage, not realizing that they still need 
to check off this remedy on the initial petition in order to argue for it 
at the plenary order of protection stage. 
Judges may be reluctant to grant this remedy due to the 
difficulties of enforcement in civil orders of protection, as contrasted 
with criminal cases where there is already probationary monitoring of 
the defendant. Other judges might not view counseling as effective in 
stopping abuse. However, judges’ views on the general efficacy of 
counseling, the desirability of obtaining the respondent’s agreement to 
the counseling, or concerns with the difficulties of monitoring 
compliance are not valid grounds for denial. 
Nevertheless, practical issues with the enforcement of this 
remedy need to be addressed. Perhaps if new funding is made 
available—for example, from entities like the National Football 
League,126—the implementation and monitoring of this remedy could 
be achieved in a fashion similar to how it functions in criminal cases 
where attending partner abuse intervention programs is required as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Id. at 60/223(b). 
126 National Football League (NFL) Commissioner Goodell sent a memo to the 
Chief Executives of and Club Presidents in the NFL, dated September 26, 2014, 
where he noted two initiatives the NFL is already engaged in to help prevent 
domestic violence and sexual assault: a partnership with the National Domestic 
Violence Hotline and the National Sexual Violence Resource Center that includes 
financial support from the NFL to both of those groups and running PSAs produced 
by NO MORE, a national campaign addressing domestic violence and sexual 
assault. See Ken Belson, Roger Goodell Cites N.F.L.’s Efforts to Fight Abuse, N.Y. 
TIMES, (Sept. 26, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/27/sports/football/nfl-
roundup.html?_r=0. In light of the NFL’s desire to help prevent domestic violence 
and sexual assault, the organization may be receptive to funding preventative 
measures such as court-mandated partner abuse intervention programs. 
Vol. 10.1]   Debra Pogrund Stark  
	  
	  166 
one of the conditions for probation. Although violation does not 
constitute a criminal offense, it can result in a rule to show cause for 
civil contempt to obtain compliance or criminal contempt to punish 
the failure to comply.  
In addition, the Act could be amended to require evidence of 
compliance within a specified period, such as a statement from the 
counseling agency that the respondent has initiated the counseling 
program with periodic reports on whether the respondent is in good 
standing with the program or completed the program. Changes to the 
Act would have to take into account privacy concerns and legal 
requirements relating to the disclosure of health care information, but 
limiting reports to cover only attendance, standing, and completion 
information may reduce this concern.127 Without this change, 
petitioners can follow up with counseling agencies to confirm 
compliance and notify courts if respondents fail to initiate counseling 
or remain in good standing in a program prior to its completion. 
Creating better training for petitioners and judges, along with creating 
a special court call for enforcement, may encourage judges to more 
widely grant this remedy with more successful outcomes.  
E. Failure to Fill in Paragraph 18 as Required in the Act 
As previously noted, none of the judges in the ninety-three case 
files reviewed complied with Section 60/221(a) of the Act which 
states: “Any order of protection shall describe the following . . . (2) 
The reason for denial of petitioner’s request for any remedy listed in 
Section 214.” This requirement is critical. First, requiring judges to 
articulate why they refuse to grant remedies assists petitioners when 
appealing a ruling by producing a record of the court’s reasoning. 
Second, this requirement might make judges less likely to deny 
remedies for reasons that are inconsistent with the Act.  
Because some judges never grant certain remedies for 
philosophical and practical reasons, further discussed below, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 For example, North Dakota allows a court to “request a report from the 
designated agency.” See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-02(4)(d) (2014). 
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compliance with Section 221(a)(2) is essential. Requiring judges to 
articulate reasons for denying remedies should cause judges to make 
more deliberate decisions, especially relating to the remedies of 
payment of support, payment of losses, counseling, and firearm 
relinquishment. It is hoped this requirement will lead judges to focus 
on the language in the Act governing the conditions for these 
remedies. 
Understanding why judges do not comply with Section 
221(a)(2) may help obtain compliance. One possible explanation is 
that judges may be unaware of it. However, Paragraph 18 of the form 
order of protection lists this requirement, indicating that judges should 
be aware of it. But, if judges noticed the statement and inquired about 
the requirement when receiving training for this court call, they may 
have been told that it is not necessary to fill in a response in this 
paragraph. Further, the judges may have missed the requirement when 
reading the statute because of its length and complexity.128  
Another possibility is that the judges noticed Paragraph 18 but 
mistakenly thought that since hearings are recorded and parties can 
obtain transcripts of the hearing, that anything they say in denying a 
sought remedy would be adequate. Judges may have confused the 
presence of Paragraph 18 with Section 214(c)(3) of the Act, which 
creates the requirement that the court: 
shall make its findings in an official record or in 
writing, and shall at a minimum set forth the 
following: (i) That the court has considered the 
applicable relevant factors described in paragraphs (1) 
and (2) of this subsection. (ii) Whether the conduct or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 “I doubt seriously, outside . . . perhaps Representative Greiman and myself, 
that there is anybody in this chamber who’s read over 10% of the Bill. If you have, I 
congratulate you, and I think that’s terrific, but I defy anybody to be able to begin to 
describe what’s in this Bill here, because you can’t do it. I can’t do it and I spent 
days looking at the Bill.” Comments of Representative Johnson, 84th Gen. 
Assembly, Reg. Sess., at 88 (Ill. May 23, 1986), available at 
http://www.ilga.gov/house/transcripts/htrans84/HT052386.pdf (speaking on House 
Bill 2409, after noting that the Bill and the amendment to it they received the same 
day it was enacted was about 150 pages long).  
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actions of respondent, unless prohibited, will likely 
cause irreparable harm or continued abuse. (iii) 
Whether it is necessary to grant the requested relief in 
order to protect petitioner or other alleged abused 
persons.129 
It is important to note that, unlike Section 221(a)(2), Section 
214(c)(3) does not require that the findings must be in the form of the 
order of protection; rather it requires “official record or in writing.” 
Second, Section 214(c) applies when courts have decided to grant 
orders of protection and are required to make certain “findings of 
fact” for this ruling.130 Section 214(c) does not apply when an 
emergency or plenary order of protection is granted, but one or more 
remedies have been denied. That situation is covered in Section 
221(a)(2). While Section 221(a)(2) specifically states that the reason 
for denial must be included in the form of the order of protection, 
courts of appeal have ruled that the statutory enumerated minimum 
findings of fact set forth in 214(c) can be made in an official record of 
the hearing—in the transcript of the hearing.131 So, if judges fail to fill 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 60/214(c)(3) (2012) (emphasis added). 
130 See, e.g., People ex rel. Minteer v. Kozin, 697 N.E. 2d 891, 894-95 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1998). The court noted that the “trial court failed to meet its statutory obligation 
to make specific findings prior to entering an order of protection under the Act.” Id. 
at 894. (emphasis added). 
131 See, e.g., In re Marriage of McCoy, 625 N.E. 2d 883, 887 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1993). 
While the written order might have contained more express 
findings, [it stated the court had considered all the relevant 
statutory factors—satisfying Section 214(c)(3)(i)] the official 
record of the hearing held . . . indicates the court found the 
evidence established respondent as a violent person whom 
petitioner had reason to fear and given respondent’s attempts to 
circumvent the visitation orders entered in the dissolution case, it 
was proper to prevent him from contacting the children at school 
by prohibiting his presence at times they were in attendance. 
Id. This satisfied the findings required under Section 214(c)(3)(ii) and (iii). 
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in Paragraph 18 because they mistakenly think that Section 214(c)(3) 
applies, then judges should receive training to correct this 
misunderstanding. Regardless of the reasoning for the omission, the 
requirement should be followed.  
The presiding judge of the Domestic Violence Division should 
take steps to provide training to judges on Section 221(a)(2)’s 
requirements. To facilitate compliance with this requirement, a 
working group should draft a list of appropriate categories of reasons 
for denial of each of the remedies. These categories would be based 
upon the Act’s conditions for remedies, with recommended wording 
for each category that judges might append to the order of protection 
(Paragraph 18 leaves little space to articulate reasons). These 
categories may allow judges to smoothly and efficiently comply with 
this statutory requirement. 
 If, however, judges continually fail to comply with Section 
221(a)(2), the presiding judge should act under her authority and 
responsibility, under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 21(g),132 to require 
judges to specify reasons for denial of remedies and provide guidance 
and suggestions on how to comply along with sample language judges 
can use. Rule 22(g) states: 
the presiding judge of each district, and the chairman 
of the Executive Committee in the First District, shall 
have the authority to determine, among other things, . . 
. and to instruct the way in which a judge on the bench 
is expected to behave. In the exercise of this general 
administrative authority, the presiding judge of each 
judicial district and the chairman of the Executive 
Committee in the First District shall take or initiate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 A similar grant of authority and responsibility is provided to the chief circuit 
judge under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 21(b); if the presiding judge fails to issue 
rules under 22(g), it is recommended that the chief circuit judge do so. See ILL. SUP. 
CT. R. 22(g).   
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appropriate measures to address the persistent failure 
of any judge to perform his or her judicial duties.133 
Committee comments to Rule 22(g) clarify that a presiding judge’s 
administrative role includes the “authority” and “responsibility” to 
address “persistent failure of any judge to perform his or her judicial 
duties.”134 Thus, the presiding judge of the Domestic Violence 
Division not only has the authority to require judges to specify 
reasons for denying remedies as required under Section 221(a)(2),135 
but also the responsibility to do so if persistent failures continue. 
Further, the presiding judge is authorized to commission a group to 
draft sample language that judges can use to comply with Section 
221(a)(2). Creating sample language for judges to use should also 
allay the concern that judges who have philosophical or practical 
issues with granting some remedies will game the Section 221(a)(2) 
requirement, by using vague justifications like “did not satisfy the 
requirements for this remedy,” 136 or that the “petitioner was not 
credible.”137  
The Illinois legislature could not have intended such vague 
justifications when it enacted the requirement in Section 221(a)(2). 
The sponsoring member of the General Assembly emphasized how 
the special remedies under the Act were tailored to meet survivors’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Id. (emphasis added). 
134 Id.  
135 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/221(a)(2) (2012). 
136 This broad statement might only be appropriate when the petitioner has 
marked off every single remedy (which does sometimes occur when the petitioner is 
acting pro se) since some of the remedies do not work as intended if put together 
such as a “general stay away” and a “stay away while intoxicated.” To mark off 
every single remedy is likely to mean that the petitioner has not given thought to 
which of the remedies applies to her situation. 
137 This would typically not be a valid reason since the judge in the 221(a)(2) 
situation has already likely found the petitioner credible because an order of 
protection with some remedies has been granted, but certain remedies sought have 
not been granted.  
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needs.138 Denial of remedies should be based on facts from the 
petitioner’s specific circumstances.  
Meaningful specification for denial of remedies requires courts 
to articulate how statutory conditions for specific remedies have not 
been satisfied. Anything short of that fails to inform petitioners why 
they did not satisfy the requirements for the sought remedy.  
Statutes need to be interpreted according to the legislative intent 
and with a presumption that words in statutes are not superfluous.139 
Vague justifications, such as “lack of credibility of the petitioner” or 
“failure to satisfy conditions for the remedy,” arguably fail to comply 
with the Section 221(a)(2) requirement. Worse yet, permitting general 
justifications facilitates the filling in of pretexts, rather than true 
reasons for denials. But even if judges use vague reasons for denial, 
appeals are still possible when records reflect that petitioners did 
present evidence satisfying the conditions for the remedy, 
notwithstanding the trial court judge’s assertions to the contrary or 
finding that the petitioner was not credible.140 If trial judges write 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 Comments of Representative Greiman, 82d Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess., at 96-
97 (Ill. May 6, 1981), available at 
http://www.ilga.gov/house/transcripts/htrans82/HT050681.pdf; 
[W]e must, I think, use our intelligence and our imagination to 
fashion remedies and to allow courts to fashion remedies to really 
take care of the needs of people in the real world. In the world of 
the street and in the world of violence, in the world of the battered 
family member. 
Id. 
139 See, e.g., Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004). The Government’s reading 
[What government? What reading is she referring to? Is this a quote from the case?]  
is thus at odds with one of the most basic interpretive canons that states, “‘[a] statute 
should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will 
be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant….’” (quoting 2A NORMAN J. 
SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06 at 181-186 (rev. 6th 
ed. 2000)). 
140 The standard for appellate review is the less deferential “manifest weight of 
evidence” standard rather than the “abuse of discretion” standard because the trial 
court’s findings are based on a preponderance of the evidence. Best v. Best, 860 
N.E. 2d 240, 244-45 (Ill. 2006). 
Vol. 10.1]   Debra Pogrund Stark  
	  
	  172 
invalid reasons, such as “payment of losses should be sought in a 
separate tort action in a small claims court,” then those kinds of 
denials could easily be appealed.  
If some judges continue to fail to comply with Section 
221(a)(2), the next alternative is a writ of mandamus. A writ of 
mandamus allows courts to compel public officials to perform non-
discretionary, ministerial duties: a writ is appropriate when public 
officials have clear duties to perform ministerial acts and have failed 
to do so; public officials have duties to comply with the terms of the 
writ; and petitioners have clear rights to the relief requested.141 These 
three elements are met when judges fail to specify reasons for denial 
because judges are public officials subject to writs of mandamus,142 
Illinois judges have a clear duty to specify reasons for denial of 
remedies under Section 221(a)(2), and this duty is mandatory.143  
Similar to judges who are required by statute to comply with 
sentencing laws, judges who deny a remedy in an order of protection 
are required to comply with Section 221(a)(2) by including a specific 
reason. This type of compliance is ministerial in nature. Ministerial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 See, e.g., Romero v. O’Sullivan, 707 N.E.2d 986, 988 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999). 
142 There are numerous cases where judges are the recipients of writs of 
mandamus under Illinois law. See, e.g., People ex rel. Daley v. Schreier, 442 N.E.2d 
185, 189 (Ill. 1982) (court awarded a writ of mandamus against a judge where the 
judge failed to follow a non-discretionary duty to follow sentencing mandates); 
People ex rel. Madigan v. Kinzer, 902 N.E.2d 667, 674 (Ill. 2009) (court granted 
mandamus against a judge when he entered a sentence that did not comply with the 
sentencing statute or Supreme Court Rule 18); Owen v. Mann, 475 N.E.2d 886, 892 
(Ill. 1985) (private party’s petition for mandamus granted and required judge to 
vacate an order compelling discovery where the communications requested were 
confidential and not subject to discovery); People ex rel. Courtney v. Thompson, 
192 N.E. 693, 697 (Ill. 1934) (court granted a writ of mandamus where the judge 
did not have the jurisdiction to hear the underlying habeas action and therefore did 
not have the ability to enter the order in question); People ex rel. Ruel v. Weaver, 
162 N.E. 205, 208 (Ill. 1928) (court issued a writ of mandamus against a judge 
because the judge did not have the discretion to vacate a prior order). 
143 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/211(a)(2) (2012). 
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acts are non-discretionary acts that officials are required to perform as 
part of their official duties.144 In Chicago v. Seben, the court stated,  
 
[o]fficial duty is ministerial when it is absolute, certain 
and imperative, involving merely the execution of a set 
task, and when the law imposes it, prescribes and 
defines the time, mode and occasion of its performance 
with such certainty, that nothing remains for judgment 
or discretion.145  
 
The duty to specify reasons for denying remedies is absolute, 
involving mere execution. The law imposing it sets the time, mode, 
and occasion for its performance (when judges have granted orders of 
protection but have denied another sought remedy).  
To satisfy the requirements for obtaining a writ of mandamus, 
the writ would only be sought when judges have already failed to 
specify reasons for denial and the writ will only relate to the precise 
action required under Section 221(a)(2). The petitioner has a clear 
right to the action (i.e. right to specified reasons for denial) under 
Section 221(a)(2).146 Petitioners under these facts should be able to 
successfully bring actions for writs of mandamus. The case law on 
writs of mandamus contains dicta that they are within a court’s 
discretion to grant.147 So even if the elements are met, a court may 
decline to issue a writ. However, based on an extensive review of 
Illinois writ of mandamus cases, it is rare for a court to exercise that 
discretion and deny a writ.148  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 The Supreme Court of the United States defined a ministerial act as one “to 
which nothing is left to discretion. It is a simple, definite duty, arising under 
conditions admitted or proved to exist, and imposed by law.” Mississippi v. 
Johnson, 71 U.S. 475, 498 (1866). 
145 165 Ill. 371, 378 (1897).  
146 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/221(a)(2) (2012). 
147 See, e.g., Gunning v. Sheahan, 73 Ill. App. 118, 129 (Ill. App. Ct. 1898); 
People ex rel. Dickinson v. Bd. of Trade, 62 N.E. 196, 199-200 (Ill. 1901); Orenic 
v. Ill. State Labor Relations Bd., 537 N.E.2d 784, 791-793 (Ill. 1989). 
148 Of 239 cases reviewed, in only nine cases did the court appear to deny a writ 
of mandamus for discretionary reasons (those reasons were that granting the writ 
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Because writs of mandamus cannot be used to direct the manner 
in which judges exercise matters within their discretion, some may 
argue that while writs of mandamus can order judges to specify 
reasons, they cannot be used to dictate which reasons are acceptable. 
But, some reasons are so invalid that judges who provide those 
reasons would be in non-compliance with Section 221(a)(2) and, 
therefore be subject to further writs of mandamus. Furthermore, as 
previously discussed, even if courts were to confine writs of 
mandamus to simply ordering judges to specify any reasons, 
specifying invalid reasons may still assist petitioners in appeals of 
their denials. 
Another possibility is an ethics claim. The Illinois Constitution, 
in Article VI, Section 15(e), provides that the Illinois Courts 
Commission has the authority to remove judges from office, suspend 
them without pay, and censure or reprimand them for “persistent 
failure to perform his or her duties, or other conduct that is prejudicial 
to the administration of justice or that brings the judicial office into 
disrepute. . . .”149 When judges violate, rather than misinterpret, 
statutes, it may be willful misconduct, subjecting the judge to 
suspension from judicial duties.  
In People ex rel. Harrod v. Illinois Courts Commission, a judge 
was charged with violating the sentencing mandates in the Illinois 
Supreme Court Rules and was suspended from judicial duties for one 
month without pay as a consequence.150 Ultimately, the Supreme 
Court of Illinois expunged this ruling, stating that the Illinois Courts 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
would: violate a contract or statute; cause public disorder, confusion, or 
inconvenience; not achieve the goal sought by the petitioner; be manifestly unjust 
because the petitioner was guilty of unclean hands; or interfere with another 
pending judicial proceeding). Memorandum from Lieyau Wong, Foley & Lardner, 
on Illinois Writs of Mandamus to Debra Stark, author (Sept. 26, 2013) (on file with 
author). 
149 ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 15, cl. c (1). The Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board has the 
authority to file a complaint with the Illinois Courts Commission for the “persistent 
failure of a judge to perform his duties.” Id. Illinois Supreme Court Rules 61 
through 71 specify the duties of judges. Specifically Rule 63 states: “A Judge 
should be faithful to the law.…” ILL. SUP. CT. R. 63(A)(1).  
150 372 N.E. 2d 53, 53 (Ill. 1977). 
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Commission exceeded its authority in sanctioning the judge because 
the violation was a matter of judicial interpretation.151  However, if 
judges in the Domestic Violence Division are not interpreting Section 
221(a)(2), for which appeals would be appropriate, but are willfully 
continuing to violate it after training from the presiding judge, their 
actions should be subject to sanction by the Illinois Courts 
Commission. As the court noted in Harrod, “[t]he fact that a judge’s 
misconduct may be remedied by the appeal of an individual defendant 
does not prevent the same conduct from being the subject of a 
disciplinary action.”152  
F. Pro Se Petitioners Failing to Seek Potentially Beneficial Remedies 
The presence of a large number of pro se petitioners among the 
ninety-three cases reviewed, 80%, raises the concern that many 
petitioners might not be aware of and be able to exercise the full range 
of rights they have under the Act. This case file review investigated 
the extent to which the petitioners sought remedies that they would 
likely benefit from and to which they were entitled. The results are 
reflected in Table 2 and Table 3. Table 3 demonstrates that petitioners 
often failed to seek the following remedies even when the specific 
facts and circumstances in their petitions and affidavits reflected that 
they might benefit from the remedies:  
1. Counseling (see Fact Pattern 3: sought “stop the abuse” 
but not “stay away” remedy); 
2. Physical care of their children (See Fact Pattern 4b: 
petitioner and respondent have children in common); 
3. Temporary legal custody (see Fact Pattern 4a: petitioner 
and respondent have children in common); 
4. Payment of support (see Fact Pattern 4c: petitioner and 
respondent have children in common);  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 Id. at 66. 
152 Id. at 65-66. 
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5. Payment of losses (See Fact Patterns 5b: threat to 
remove/actual removal of child or costs to get child back 
facts and 10: medical expenses, lost earnings damage to 
property, temporary shelter); 
6. Restricted visitation (see Fact Pattern 6: abuse of child, 
abuse of petitioner in front of child, conceal child or 
visitation to abuse); and  
7. Prohibition of access to records (See Fact Patterns 5c: 
threat to remove/actual removal of child or costs to get 
child back facts and 7: child in common and petition does 
not identify location of petitioner or in petition sought no 
contact with child). 
The underutilization of remedies by pro se petitioners is 
probably greater than reflected here. If pro se petitioners do not 
carefully review and understand the remedy boxes on the petition, 
then they are less likely to include facts relating to those remedies in 
their affidavits. Since the report is based on the facts contained in the 
affidavits, actual underutilization is likely greater than reported here.  
One reason for this underutilization may be that petitioners are 
not aware of these remedies or do not understand the remedies or their 
benefits. Alternatively, judges might dissuade petitioners from 
seeking some remedies.153 A third possibility is that petitioners may 
be aware that they are entitled to these remedies but decide not to 
pursue them for a variety of reasons, including fear of enraging the 
respondent further or the practical difficulty of enforcement.  
The results from the data collected raise questions on how best 
to educate pro se petitioners on these remedies, specifically about the 
circumstances under which they apply, the benefits, and the ways to 
address the problems in obtaining them. Some of this education 
already takes place at the courthouse154 and by judges,155 but the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 There is anecdotal evidence that court clerks, advocates, and even lawyers 
inform petitioners that judges do not grant certain remedies and thusly, it may not 
be a good idea to seek those remedies.  
154 For example, pro se petitioners at the 555 W. Harrison Courthouse receive an 
informational booklet that adequately explains who can obtain an order of 
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current information provided to pro se petitioners is clearly 
inadequate. 
One strategy might have judges read from a uniform, prepared 
statement at the start of the court call. The statement should inform 
petitioners of the requirements to obtain an emergency order of 
protection, the key remedies available under it, preconditions for these 
remedies, as well as of the importance of keeping a copy of the 
emergency order of protection on their person to provide to police.156 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
protection and what the judge will require for the petitioner to obtain an emergency 
order of protection; but, the booklet could be more detailed. The information on 
remedies in the booklet, however, is cursory in nature. The decision to not explain 
the remedies more fully in the information booklet was due to a concern expressed 
by some who work with petitioners that it would take too long for the petitioner to 
review a lengthy explanation of each of these remedies and then still be able to 
obtain, in the same day that the petitioner arrives at the courthouse, an emergency 
order of protection. Notes from Leslie Landis, Court Administrator, Illinois 
Domestic Violence Court, to Debra Stark, author (Aug. 27, 2013) (on file with 
author). It is also difficult, in general, to create a clear, easy-to-understand, and 
comprehensive booklet on the eighteen fairly complicated remedies without 
creating information-overload to a petitioner. To be most useful, for each of the 
remedies, the booklet should give an example of a situation where the remedy can 
be most helpful, the conditions for qualifying for the remedy, and what evidence or 
testimony would need to be presented to obtain the remedy. The author hopes that 
this booklet, when completed, could be used by those who assist survivors of 
domestic violence before the survivor appears in court, as well as once in court. 
Currently, pro se petitioners also may receive assistance from court clerks, 
advocates, and trained law students in filling out the paperwork.  
155 Student court monitors noted that judges would sometimes try to explain to a 
pro se party what “hearsay” was, what a “preponderance of the evidence” meant, 
and even quote from the statute on what is “abuse” when a party seemed to need 
this information. As Table 3 reflects, some judges granted the remedy of protection 
of pets even when the petitioner failed to seek this remedy in their petition. 
156 This opening statement can also be made available to judges who do not sit 
on the specialized domestic violence court call (orders of protection can be heard in 
many other courts) so that if and when they have an order of protection matter 
before them with pro se parties, they can then read from this statement at that time 
to educate the parties. It should be noted, however, that by the time of the start of 
the court call, the pleadings have already been filed and it would be difficult to 
modify them before the case is called. Perhaps a support area in or near the 
courtroom could be created to assist with any necessary changes to the pleadings 
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For pro se respondents, the standard statement should inform them of 
their responsibilities when a plenary order of protection is issued 
against them, including a warning that a stay away order is effective 
until its term ends or a judge vacates it. The statement should 
emphasize to respondents that petitioners cannot terminate the order 
of protection and that failure to stay away is an unconditional 
violation of the order subject to criminal prosecution. Whenever 
respondents voluntarily agree to plenary orders of protection and are 
not represented, judges should inform them that plenary orders of 
protection can potentially affect respondents’ ability to get jobs or 
possess or carry firearms.  
Some judges, however, may be reluctant to provide information 
that can be construed as advice and uncertain how to balance the 
information provided to each party, especially when departing from a 
standardized opening statement. The rules of ethics that apply to 
judges should be modified to provide more guidance on how judges 
should handle situations in which they provide information to pro se 
parties.  
The presiding judge of the Illinois Domestic Violence Division 
should also convene a work group—comprised of representatives of 
attorneys and advocates who represent petitioners, attorneys who 
represent respondents, and interested judges—to tackle this problem. 
The work group could recommend language that would be beneficial 
to pro se parties as part of a standard opening statement and standard 
explanations of typical legal issues that arise that judges could use as 
needed. Since the opening statement should be brief to preserve time 
to adjudicate cases, pro se parties should receive further information 
on their rights, obligations, and options through a video or computer 
program at the courthouse, with petitioners and respondents observing 
the video seated at computer tables in separate areas of the 
courthouse. This type of information should also be offered in written 
form to supplement the current information booklet.  
Another strategy might be to better utilize the Section 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
with judges permitting the petitioner to move their case to the end of the court call 
so the petitioner can obtain assistance to modify their pleading. 
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214(b)(13) payment of losses remedy. Section 214(b)(13) states: 
“Order respondent to pay petitioner for losses suffered as a direct 
result of the abuse. . . . Such losses shall include, but not be limited to 
. . . reasonable attorney’s fees, [and] court costs.” In Steward v. 
Schluter, the Illinois Appellate Court ruled that this clause clearly 
applies to attorney’s fees for petitioners who hire attorneys to 
represent them seeking an order of protection, and would also apply 
to situations where courts appoint attorneys to represent petitioners 
seeking orders of protection.157 If attorneys were routinely granted 
attorney’s fees for their time in obtaining orders of protection under 
Section 214(b)(13), more petitioners would likely be able to hire 
attorneys to represent them and explain to them the numerous options 
and rights provided to them under the Act. While some respondents 
lack the financial resources to pay petitioners’ attorney’s fees and 
some petitioners fear that seeking a financial remedy might further 
enrage respondents or make separation more difficult, in some 
situations, respondents have sufficient means and petitioners can 
safely seek this remedy.  
Currently, petitioners are unlikely to even know that this remedy 
exists. They may see a box for “payment of losses” in the petition but 
are unlikely to know that this includes recovering their attorney’s fees 
for obtaining the order of protection. The educational materials to be 
developed, as described above, could provide this information and be 
disseminated not only at the courthouse but also in other useful 
locations, such as shelters.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 Steward ex rel. v. Schluter, 819 N.E. 2d 1, 5-6 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). The court 
ruled that the respondent was responsible to pay the attorney’s fees for an attorney 
appointed by the court and paid for by the county to represent the petitioner seeking 
an order of protection under Section 214(b)(13) and then further stated: 
Had petitioner hired an attorney on her own, the court could 
clearly have ordered that the attorney fees be paid by the 
respondent. We see no reason why the court should be prevented 
from ordering respondent to pay for petitioner’s attorney in this 
case where the attorney was provided to petitioner by the court. 
Id. at 6 (citation omitted).  
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In addition, in situations when adequate free legal assistance is 
not available, domestic violence advocates could suggest that 
attorneys, whose fees will be paid by respondents, represent 
survivors. An attorney who is specially trained in domestic violence, 
the Act, and related areas of divorce and paternity law could represent 
survivors seeking orders of protection when the petitioner is seeking 
complicated remedies or the respondent is represented by an attorney. 
This strategy could greatly improve petitioners’ chances of obtaining 
complicated remedies such as payment of support, payment of losses, 
firearm relinquishment, counseling, and temporary legal custody. 
These attorneys would also be aware of the importance of creating 
records for appeal and would take steps to do so especially when 
representing petitioners seeking remedies that judges are more 
reluctant to grant.  
 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESULTS OF THE EMPIRICAL STUDY FOR 
OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
While empirical studies similar to the one conducted here are 
beyond the scope of this Article, it is clear that other states have at 
least some of the same problems with domestic violence remedies. 
For instance, in both California and Wisconsin, judges have 
purposefully failed to comply with statutory requirements relating to 
firearm relinquishment.158 Further, a number of other state 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 Greer & Purvis, supra note 108, at 276-82.  
Too often, because of a personal disagreement with the political 
underpinnings and constitutional implications of these policies, 
trial court judges have attempted to obviate the mandatory firearm 
restriction language in the California statute and, in particular the 
state preprinted domestic violence form…. 
Id. at 276. 
Overall, of the 76,787 active protective orders in 2004 [in 
California], 4,215 of them were defective. . . . Two months after 
the California Department of Justice sent law enforcement 
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jurisdictions include firearm removal as a remedy in their order of 
protection type statutes,159 but it is unclear how often judges enforce 
these measures.  
Other states also have statutes that grant financial remedies, 
such as payment of support160 or payment of losses,161 as part of an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
agencies a notifying letter containing a clear directive to properly 
record and enter protective orders into the Domestic Violence 
Restraining Order System . . . the overall defective rate dropped to 
2.6 percent. 
Id. at 282 (citations omitted).  
159 Based on a review of seventeen jurisdictions’ laws relating to orders of 
protection, eleven of these jurisdictions provide for the remedy of relinquishment of 
firearms as a remedy. See N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-07.1-02(4)(g) (2014); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(F)(2) (LexisNexis 2008); OR. REV. STAT. § 
107.718(1)(h)(A) (2013) (which permits “other relief’ and language in petitions call 
for this relief); 23 PA. STAT. ANN. § 6108(a)(7) (2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-3 
(2014); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-604(c)(1) (2014); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 
85.022(a)(1) (West 2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-7-106(2)(d) (LexisNexis 2014); 
WASH. REV. CODE §26.50.060(1)(k) (2014); W. VA. CODE § 48-27-502(b)-(c) 
(2012); and WIS. STAT. § 813.12(4m)(a)(2) (2014). 
160 Based on a review of seventeen jurisdictions’ laws relating to orders of 
protection, twelve of these jurisdictions provide for the remedy of payment of 
support: N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-02(4)(e); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
3113.31(E)(1)(e); 23 PA. STAT. ANN. § 6108(a)(5); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-3(a)(4) 
(for child support); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-60(C)(2) (2014); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 
25-10-5(4); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-606(a)(7); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 
85.022(a)(1); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-7-106(2)(i); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 
1103(c)(2)(F) (2014) (for child support and capped at three months which can be 
extended if consolidated with an action for legal separation, divorce, or parentage); 
W. VA. CODE § 48-27-503(5); and WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-105(b)(ii) (2014). 
One other jurisdiction, Oregon, provides for the remedy of “emergency monetary 
assistance” from the respondent to the petitioner. OR. REV. STAT. § 
107.718(1)(h)(A). 
161 Based on a review of seventeen jurisdictions’ laws relating to orders of 
protection, two of these jurisdictions provide for the general remedy of payment of 
losses similar to the Act remedy. See 23 PA. STAT. ANN. § 6108(a)(8); W. VA. CODE 
ANN. § 48-27-503(11). However, seven of the seventeen jurisdictions provide for 
the remedy of recovery of attorney’s fees, including Pennsylvania and West 
Virginia, as noted above, and North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, and 
Washington. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-02(4)(e); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 
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order of protection. It is unclear if and how often judges enforce these 
measures. Although counseling can be ordered in other 
jurisdictions,162 it is unclear how often is it ordered. Overall, more 
research is necessary to fully determine how other states can improve 
their legal systems but that is beyond the scope of this article.  
More importantly, other states can look to the Illinois model to 
explore both the successes and the limitations of a court that 
specializes in domestic violence. As noted earlier, one consequence of 
appearing before a specialized court is that both positive and 
problematic practices, such as not granting certain remedies, are more 
likely to become ingrained in the process through judicial memory 
rather than formal training. Consequently, petitioners might obtain a 
full range of remedies in general courts compared to courts that 
specialize.  
Furthermore, when advocates and attorneys working in 
specialized courthouses see that judges will not grant certain 
remedies, even when properly sought, the advocates and attorneys 
may self-censor, as seen in Cook County.163 Petitioners may stop 
seeking those remedies, thereby reinforcing the practice of judges not 
granting those remedies. Once this practice becomes entrenched, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60.2(A)(2)(C)(1) (2014); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-60(C)(6); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 
81.005(a); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.50.060(1)(g). Three of these jurisdictions 
provide for the remedy of recovery of medical costs, including Pennsylvania and 
West Virginia, as noted above, and Wyoming. See 23 PA. STAT. ANN. § 6108(a)(8); 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-105(b)(iii). 
162 Based on a review of seventeen jurisdictions’ laws relating to orders of 
protection, ten of these jurisdictions provide for the remedy of counseling. See N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-02(4)(d); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(1)(f); OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.4(C)(1); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.718(6)(c) (but more limited 
in nature by conditioning the remedy on what is necessary for the safety of the 
respondent’s child); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-10-5(5); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-
606(a)(8); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 85.022(a)(1); WASH. REV. CODE § 
26.50.060(1)(e); W. VA. CODE § 48-27-503(8); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-
105(a)(vii).  
163 See supra note 96. 
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advocates and attorneys may fear that seeking these remedies for their 
clients could backfire.164  
But, creating courthouses that specialize in domestic violence is 
not a mistake. The answer to the problem of judicial nullification is 
not to do away with generally well-functioning courthouses, but 
instead to better train and educate judges, reform problematic 
practices, modify laws as necessary so that they are better able to be 
implemented, and when necessary, take aggressive steps to appeal 
judicial decisions when they are inconsistent with the legislative 
protections that have been enacted.165 Once this groundwork is laid, 
attorneys and advocates who assist survivors in obtaining orders of 
protection should no longer fear judicial reprisal when they seek the 
full range of remedies to which their clients are entitled. 
CONCLUSION 
The results from this empirical study are mixed. On the 
positive side, the data collected reflects that judges are properly 
applying many important aspects of the order of protection law, and 
granting a high percentage of emergency orders of protection. On the 
negative side, the data also reflected the problem of judicial 
nullification and petitioners failing to seek certain remedies from 
which they could benefit.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 This information comes from conversations the author had with attorneys and 
advocates who assist petitioners seeking orders of protection in Cook County, 
Illinois. 
165 Indeed, the presiding judge for the courthouse, one of the focuses of this 
empirical study, created a “Remedies Work Group” focusing on these problems. 
The presiding judge expressed a commitment to providing training for judges and 
advocates, and further educational information for the many pro se petitioners as a 
means to encourage and facilitate the seeking and granting of the full range of 
remedies that petitioners are entitled to under the Act. As discussed in the Article, 
another key problem that contributes to remedies not being sought and granted is 
the large percentage of pro se petitioners who simply may not be aware of all of the 
remedies they can benefit from and how to go about seeking them properly. This 
must also be addressed. 
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This Article argued that these problems are exacerbated by the 
specialized domestic violence court call, where problematic judicial 
practices can become more entrenched. As those who assist 
petitioners observe certain remedies not being granted, they see a 
pattern and conform their conduct accordingly. Some attorneys decide 
not to seek potentially beneficial remedies because of the perceived 
futility in doing so. Some attorneys even fear that by seeking some of 
these remedies, especially the financial ones, petitioners may lose 
credibility and be denied any order of protection at all.  
Survivors of domestic abuse in Illinois have a good system, 
but not all are receiving optimal benefit from it—the full range of 
remedies petitioners are entitled to under the Act are not being 
applied. As outlined by this Article, a number of key steps should be 
taken so that the full legislative promise of comprehensive protection 
to survivors of domestic violence can be realized.  
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APPENDIX 
List of Tables 
 
1. General Results from Court Monitoring/Case File Review (93 
Cases) 
2. Total Number of Remedies Sought and Remedies Granted (93 
Cases) 





General Results from Court Monitoring/Case File Review (93 
Cases) 
 
1. Emergency Order of Protection: 
a. Granted: 75 [81% of 93 cases]166 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 Due to some slight differences in results reported when different student 
researchers reviewed the case files at different times (due to a mistaken double 
counting of results in three cases, the status of cases changing, the contents of the 
file being out of chronological order, and, on one occasion, an emergency order of 
protection missing from the court file), we decided to base the number of 
emergency orders of protection and plenary orders of protection granted among our 
ninety-three case data sample from the computer records on these files at the 
courthouse. The computer-based results on emergency orders of protection and 
plenary orders of protection granted were a bit lower than the original results we 
found when reviewing the court files by hand (emergency orders of protection 
granted dropped from 88% to 81% and plenary orders of protection granted dropped 
from 49% to 47%), but due to the changing composition of documents located in 
some of the court files we decided to go with the computer records rather than the 
court files in reporting the number of emergency orders of protection and plenary 
orders of protection issued. Yet even the computer records could be difficult at 
times to parse through with a notation of an emergency order of protection being 
denied and then later a notation that the “ex parte order was continued” (we treated 
this as an emergency order of protection granted as this was consistent with our 
initial court file review of that case). 
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b. Denied: 18 
 
2. Plenary Order of Protection: 
 
a. Granted: 44 [47% of 93 cases]  
 
b. Not Granted: 49 
 
3. Situations Where a Plenary Order of Protection was Not Granted 
Due to Denial at a Hearing or Due to the Petitioner Dropping the 
Case: 
 
a. Hearing held and plenary order of protection denied: 13 
[26% of 49 cases where the plenary order of protection 
was not granted] 
 
b. Petitioner appeared in court on return date and dropped 
the case: 3 
 
i. Case continued at some point due to failure to serve the 
respondent: 0 
 
ii. Case continued more than once to serve the respondent: 
0 
 
c. Petitioner failed to appear in court and the case was 
dismissed: 24  
 
i. Case continued at some point due to failure to serve the 
respondent: 2 
 
ii. Case continued more than once to serve the respondent: 
7 
 
d. Total number of dropped cases: 27 [55% of 49 cases 
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where a plenary order of protection not issued]167 
 
4. Service Data: 
 
a. Personal service achieved: 61  
 
i. Sheriff: 20 
ii. Open Court: 37  
iii. Special Process Server: 0 
iv. Short form notice: 4 
 
b. Service by publication: 12 
 
c. No service record in the file as of the review date:168 20  
 
5. Special Remedies Granted: 
a. Support Payments: 0 
b. Prohibition of Firearm Possession: 0 
c. Counseling: 2 
d. Payment of Losses: 0 
 
6. Specifying Reason for Denial of Remedies (required by the Act): 0 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 There is a discrepancy between the total number of cases where the plenary 
order of protection was not granted (forty-nine), against the combination of the total 
number of cases reported as dropped (twenty-seven), with the total number of cases 
where the court ruled that the plenary order of protection was denied at a hearing 
(thirteen). It appears that this discrepancy is based on the fact that when the initial 
review of cases was performed, the researchers focused only on cases where the 
emergency order of protection was granted and not where the emergency order of 
protection was denied. Later we included cases and collected data in the cases 
where an emergency order of protection was denied, since some petitioners still 
move forward after a denial of the emergency order of protection and proceed with 
a petition for a plenary order of protection with notice to the respondent. However, 
it appears that we did not incorporate those cases into the statistics on why a plenary 
order of protection was not granted. 
168 This category also includes cases where the emergency order of protection 
was denied and the petitioner did not seek to continue the case with notice to the 
respondent. 




7. Total # of pro se litigants:  
 
a. Petitioner 
i. Pro se: 74 [80% of 93 cases] 
ii. Attorney: 19  
 
b. Respondent 
i. Pro se (no appearance filed):169 90 [97% of 93 cases] 
ii. Attorney (appearance filed): 3  
 
8. Timeliness Data (timing between last incident and 
petition/affidavit): 
 
a. 0-3 days: 48  
b. 4-7 days: 14 
c. 7-14 days: 4 
d. 2-4 weeks: 9  
e. 5-7 weeks: 0 
f. 2-3 months: 3 
g. >3 months: 1  
h. unknown: 14  
 
In the seventeen cases where the last incident was greater than seven 
days from when the petitioner came to court to seek an emergency 
order of protection, thirteen emergency orders of protection were 
granted and four emergency orders of protection were denied (i.e. 23% 
were denied compared with only 19% of emergency orders of 
protection being denied from the general sample of ninety-three cases). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 The percentage of pro se defendants here may be over-reported in that it was 
determined based on looking for appearances filed by an attorney for the respondent 
and if no appearance was filed, the respondent was classified as acting “pro se.” 
There is anecdotal evidence that sometimes attorneys for respondents come for a 
court date and enter into agreements or go to a hearing without ever actually filing 
an appearance in the case (perhaps to avoid costs for this filing).  
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Nine of the seventeen cases led to the granting of a plenary order of 
protection (two from cases where the emergency orders of protection 
were originally denied but the case proceeded anyhow) and eight of the 




Total Number of Remedies Sought and Remedies Granted (93 
Cases) 
 
Table 2 reflects the total number of remedies sought and granted from 
the ninety-three case files reviewed, without filtering the results to 
exclude remedies that were sought without a basis as reflected in the 



















(b)(1) Prohibition of 
abuse, neglect or 
exploitation 
91 73 42 




82 63 33 
(b)(3) Stay away order 83 69 35 
(b)(4) Counseling 19 No per the 
Act 
2 
(b)(5) Physical care 
and possession 
of the minor 
child 
25 21 12 
(b)(6) Temporary legal 
custody 
15 No per the 
Act 
5 
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(b)(7) Visitation 26 19 14 
(b)(8) Removal or 
concealment of 
minor child 
28 20 13 
(b)(9) Order to appear 6 0 0 
(b)(10) Possession of 
personal 
property 
14 6 1 
(b)(11) Protection of 
property 
76 45 27 
(b)(11.5) Protection of 
animals 
0 5 2 
(b)(12) Payment of 
support 
3 No per the 
Act 
0 
(b)(13) Payment of 
losses 
2 No per the 
Act 
0 
(b)(14) Prohibition of 
entry while 
under influence 
1 3 3 
(b)(14.5) Prohibition of 
firearm 
possession 
11 0 0 
(b)(15) Prohibition of 
access to records 
16 12 4 
(b)(16) Payment of 
shelter services 
1 No per the 
Act 
0 
(b)(17) Order for 
injunctive relief 
42 21 25 








n of remedy 
N/A 0 0 
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Table 3170 
 
Breakdown of Remedies Sought and Granted Under Twelve Fact 
Patterns 
 
To better ascertain whether petitioners were seeking appropriate 
remedies based on the facts in their affidavits and whether courts in 
such instances were granting the remedies sought, Table 3 contains 
twelve fact patterns as determined from a review of the affidavits and 
petitions that would suggest the seeking of certain remedies by the 




















	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 Table 3 provides a Fact Pattern Overview. Column 1 describes the Specific Fact 
Pattern. Column 2 provides the Fact patterns determined in each based on a review 
of the affidavit and petition in the court file; it is possible that there were additional 
examples of the fact pattern among the cases in the data sample (for example some 
of these facts may have only been raised during a court hearing). Consequently, the 
number of cases identified as having this fact pattern may be under-inclusive. 
Column 3: Excludes instances where the petition inappropriately sought this remedy 
because the facts in the affidavit and petition did not support this remedy (for 
example, some petitioners marked off all eighteen remedies). Although further facts 
may have been revealed in court to support this remedy, since we do not know this 
was the case, we did not include in the category of remedies sought here anywhere 
the petition appeared to inappropriately seek this remedy. We thought it unfair to 
reflect that a judge failed to grant a sought remedy when it appeared that the 
petitioner who sought the remedy did not appear to qualify for the remedy. The 
purpose of Table 3 is to assess the degree to which judges granted or failed to grant 
various remedies when the facts in the affidavit and petition supported the remedy 
sought. Table 2, in contrast, includes all situations where a petitioner sought a 
remedy, whether it appeared appropriate or not. 
 






























































of abuse) but 
not remedy 3 
(stay away) 





Fact # cases # cases # cases 6 # cases 6 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 Cases were counted under the shared residence fact pattern if they 
specifically claimed a shared residence, identified a spousal relationship between 
the parties, or otherwise mentioned their shared home in the petition or affidavit. 
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Common  39 3 No per the 0 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 Although many petitioners sought protection for their children, cases were 
only counted under this “common children” fact pattern when it was clear from the 
petition and/or affidavit that the petitioner and respondent were together the legal 
parents of any children. Therefore, petitioners seeking protection for their children 
where the respondent was not the legal parent of the child were not included in this 
category. 
 






























child or costs 
to get child 
back facts 
4 4 3 2 
 
5. (b) 






















child or costs 
to get child 
back facts 
4 1 No per Act 0 
 
5. (c) 





# cases 15 
granted at 
emergency 
# cases 15 
granted at 
plenary 
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Child in 12 5 6 2 


































































0 0 0 0 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 Despite the lack of specific mention of this fact pattern, this remedy (along 
with 1, 2, and 3) was among the most frequently granted. See Table 1. 
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174 Table 2 reveals that although this fact pattern was not raised from a review of 
the affidavit or petition, it was granted in several instances. It is likely that 
information was revealed in a court hearing that warranted the protection of 
animals. 
 
175 The two cases where this fact pattern was present involved damage to 
personal property. 




use and did 
not seek 
remedy 3176 
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176 Although only one case of drug or alcohol use did not seek the remedy 3 stay 
away remedy, facts involving respondent’s use of drugs and/or alcohol were 
common in the cases reviewed. 
 
177 No shelter facts were present in the petition or affidavit of the cases reviewed. 
This is not surprising given the likelihood that a petitioner would not want this 
information revealed to the respondent. 
 
